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ENFORCING SELF-REGULATORY
ORGANIZATION'S PENALTIES AND
THE NATURE OF SELF-REGULATION
JonathanMacey & Caroline Novogrod*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Few issues are as poorly understood and under-theorized as the
concept of "industry self-regulation." The Second Circuit recently raised
important issues about the nature of such self-regulations when it held
that the industry's self-regulatory agency, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), 1 lacked the authority to judicially
enforce the fines it levies against member broker-dealers. 2
In this Article we provide a theoretical framework for
understanding the nature of self-regulation and then discuss the role of
courts in effectuating the self-regulatory process. Our thesis is simple:
the success of industry self-regulation critically depends on the market
power of the firms in the self-regulatory organization ("SRO"). If the
firms have market power, then as long as the industry generates profits
for members, self-regulation can work. But if either profitability or
market power decline, self-regulation will fail. We believe that our
analysis leads to a deeper understanding of the appropriate relationship

* Jonathan Macey is the Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corprate Finance and
Securities Law at Yale Law School. Caroline Novogrod is an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton
LLP.
1. With approximately 3300 employees and twenty regional offices in addition to principal
offices in New York City and Washington, D.C., FINRA is "the largest independent regulator for all
securities firms doing business in the United States. FINRA's mission is to protect America's
investors by making sure the securities industry operates fairly and honestly. All told, FINRA
oversees about 4380 brokerage firms, about 163,150 branch offices and approximately 633,000
registered securities representatives." Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., About the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, F1NRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2012) [hereinafter About FINRA].
2. Fiero v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 571-72, 574 (2d Cir. 2011).
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between self-regulatory agencies and the judiciary, where the issue is
whether and to what extent a self-regulatory organization can invoke the
power of the courts to enforce its rules and disciplinary decisions.
FINRA was created pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"),3 which contemplated a system wherein
member-owned securities exchanges and broker-dealer associations
would regulate the activities of its member securities firms, subject to
the oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").4 The
securities self-regulatory framework under which FINRA operates has
undergone significant changes since its creation. One such change
occurred in 2007, when FINRA's predecessor, the National Association
of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), and the regulatory arm of the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE"), merged to form FINRA, the
single self-regulator for all securities firms doing business with the
public. 5 Today, FINRA continues to provide regulation for all U.S.
securities firms that transact with the public.6 FINRA is responsible for
the "surveillance, investigation and enforcement of more than eighty
percent of U.S. equity trading.",7 The major securities exchanges now
outsource significant oversight and disciplinary responsibilities,
including market regulation functions, to FINRA.8 The SEC has
delegated significant duties to FINRA, which now monitors the internal
operations of its members, all of which are also regulated by the SEC. 9
FINRA's revenue almost equals the operating budget of the SEC.' 0

3. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)etseq. (2006&Supp. IV2011).
4. See generally id.
5. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement
Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm
Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-56,145
(July 26,2007), 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169, 42,169-70 (Aug. 1,2007).
6. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., GET TO KNow Us. 2-3 (2012), [hereinafter FINRA BROCHURE],
available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/documents/corporate/
p1 18667.pdf.
7. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL
REPORT 3 (2011) [hereinafter FINRA 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p 127312.pdf.
8. See id.at 7, 22; see also About FINRA, supra note 1; FINRA BROCHURE, supra note 6,
at2-3.
9. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA 2011 YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL
REPORT 1-3 (2012) [hereinafter FINRA 2011 REPORT], available at http://www.finra.orglweb
/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p127312.pdf; SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 20-21, 129, (2011), [hereinafter SEC 2011
REPORT], availableat http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar20l1 .pdf.
10. Compare FINRA 2011 REPORT, supra note 9, at35, with SEC 2011 REPORT, supra note
9, at 35.
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It is intriguing that an organization as wealthy and important as
FINRA has difficulty enforcing its own rules. 1 We believe that this
important fact has broad implications for our understanding of FINRA's
responsibilities, as FINRA was unable to compel a former member to
pay its fines. In Fiero v. FinancialIndustry Regulatory Authority, Inc., 2
FINRA sought to collect a one million dollar fine it previously had
assessed against a broker-dealer fn-m3 that FINRA also expelled for
alleged improper short-selling activity.'
The Exchange Act obligates the securities association to
"appropriately discipline[]" its members for violating the Exchange Act,
SEC rules, and FINRA's own rules. 14 Permissible penalties include
"expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and
operations, fine, censure, being suspended or barred from being
associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction."' 5
FINRA does not have explicit statutory authorization to bring
private rights of action in court to enforce the penalties it assesses
against members.' 6 The Second Circuit construed this to mean that
Congress did not intend to grant such authority to SROs. 17 The court
addressed the seemingly obvious gap in FINRA's enforcement scheme,
which empowers FINRA to impose but not enforce fines, explaining,
"FINRA fines are already enforced by a draconian sanction not
involving court action. '' t8 According to the court, Congress knew that
FINRA had always relied on this enforcement mechanism of expulsion
and exclusion, and has therefore left the enforcement scheme
unaltered.' 9 It is precisely this claim about SROs in general and FINRA
in particular that we analyze in this paper.
In our view, the mechanisms available to FINRA to enforce its
rules and mandates reveal something profound about the nature of selfregulation in general, and specifically about the allocation of power
between FINRA and the firms it regulates. The notion embraced by the
Second Circuit, and perhaps by Congress as well, is that SROs such as
11. See, e.g., Fiero v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 571, 574 (2d Cir. 2011).
12. 660 F.3d 569.
13. Id. at 572; Fiero v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 500, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), rev'd by, 660 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011).
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2006). "The Exchange Act
currently exposes SROs to disciplinary sanction if they fail to enforce the rules they promulgate."
Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FiN. & COM. L. 317, 344 (2007) [hereinafter Dombalagian, Selfand Self-Regulation].
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7).
16. Fiero, 660 F.3d at 574-75.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 576.
19. Id. at 576-77.
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FINRA do not require the assistance of the courts in order to
successfully carry out their self-regulatory activities.2 ° In our view, that
position is based on an as-yet-unanalyzed assumption that FINRA has
sufficient power over its industry members to enable FINRA not merely
to assess penalties against them, but also to collect and otherwise enforce
such penalties.
We argue here that there must be some economic rents (supercompetitive profits) associated with an industry in order for the SRO in
that industry to be successful in imposing self-regulation absent an
ability to invoke various powers of the federal courts to help with
enforcement. This is true because if those in a regulated industry were
earning only normal rates of return, instead of economic rents, then
expulsion would be a matter of indifference and sanctions could be
ignored. In this case, expulsion would result merely in a job change for
transgressors, who would profit from wrongdoing until caught. Then, the
transgressors would simply change professions to another competitive
profession in which one earns a normal, competitive rate of return.
Alternatively, an SRO such as FINRA can be made to work
effectively on its own without the power of the courts even if member
firms are not earning economic rents if the individuals in the firm who
are subject to the SRO's regulations are themselves earning economic
rents. Self-regulation will also work in an industry in which employees
must make firm or industry specific investments, thereby making the
cost of a disciplinary sanction such as expulsion highly salient. In this
case, expulsion would cause any employee who had made such
investments to forfeit forever the future returns associated with the
investments.
Thus, the principal way that SROs traditionally have been able to
enforce their own rules without having to use the government's civil and
criminal enforcement power is by maintaining a monopoly and using
their credible threat to be able to exclude a participating firm from the
cartel as its ultimate enforcement mechanism.
In other words, SROs such as FINRA, in order to enforce their own
rules, must have and maintain market power over the industry they are
regulating. In his opinion in Fiero, Judge Winter seems to have
acknowledged this fact when he observed that "[o]ne cannot deal in
securities with the public without being a member of FINRA. When a
member fails to pay a fine levied by FINRA, FINRA can revoke the
20. See id.at 576 (noting that "significant underenforcement of the securities laws and
FINRA rules is hardly the inevitable result of FINRA's inability to bring fine-enforcement actions,"
and that NASD/FINRA has long relied on its ability to revoke the registrations of non-compliant
members).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss4/6

4

Macey and Novogrod: Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization's Penalties and the Nature

ENFORCING SRO PENALTIES

2012]

member's registration, resulting in exclusion from the industry., 21 Judge
Winter's premise here is that because FINRA is the only supplier of a
service that securities brokers demand (market access), members pay the
prices FINRA sets. 22 However, Judge Winter did not seem to
acknowledge an additional fact, which is that if perfect or near-perfect
substitute employment opportunities exist outside of the industry from
which one is expelled, then the threat of sanctions will not23 influence
miscreants' conduct, or will influence it only very marginally.
Our point is that FINRA's ability to exercise market power to
compel compliance is neither inevitable, nor static. Said another way,
the costs of having one's membership in FINRA revoked is not constant
over time (or the same for everyone). In particular, if a member firm that
is expelled can redeploy its human and fixed capital in pursuit of
alternative activities that are equally profitable to the activities within the
SRO's jurisdiction, then the threat of punishment, up to and including
fines or expulsion, would not have any deterrent effect whatsoever. For
example, if members could simply and costlessly join a rival securities
association or participate in the securities industry notwithstanding its
lack of membership in FINRA, the threat of expulsion would no longer
serve to dissuade members from violating FINRA's rules.
Likewise, if a securities broker's skills, training, and expertise were
costlessly transferable to other endeavors such as mortgage origination
or selling insurance or commodities, then regulated brokers could forgo
paying their fines and instead join new industries. The threat of
expulsion incentivizes members to pay fines only to the extent that being
deprived of membership in F1NRA is costly, and such membership is
only costly if FINRA is a monopoly.
On this basis, we argue that an SRO's enforcement power is a
function of its market power. As market power goes up, so too does its
power over the entities it regulates. Thus, the efficacy of even a
monopolist's power to enforce its rules privately without the help of the
state is symmetrical with its power to exclude. But because breaking
rules is, of course, always perceived to provide a benefit to the rulebreaker, the size of the penalties imposed on a prospective rule-breaker
matters, as does the probability that the rule-breaker will be detected.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we provide a brief
overview of FINRA, including its rules and sanctioning policies, and
recent criticisms of the SRO. In Part II, we discuss the history of SROs

21.

Id.

22.

See id

23.

See infra Part W.B.2.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 40:963

and their use of market power to compel member compliance. We also
discuss the exchanges' loss of market power and the challenges posed to
the exchanges' self-regulatory mission. In Part III, we look at recent
trends in the brokerage industry to suggest that FINRA may also be
losing market power and the impact this would have on FINRA's
deterrence and enforcement regime. In the Conclusion, we suggest
possible ways FINRA can improve its ability to deter misconduct and
enforce FINRA's disciplinary fines.
II.

A.

OVERVIEW

Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry

to extend selfIn 1938, Congress amended the Exchange 2 Act
25
4
regulation to the over-the-counter ("OTC") market. The Maloney Act
authorized the Commission to delegate to national associations
regulatory oversight of broker-dealers that were not members of a
national securities exchange.26 Like the exchanges', an association's
rules must be "designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices" and provide for disciplining members by censure, fine,
suspension, expulsion, or any other fitting sanctions for violating the
Exchange Act provisions, rules promulgated thereunder, and the
association's own rules. 27 The NASD registered in 1939.28 Although the
statute did not restrict the number of associations that could be formed,
NASD remained the only one for securities broker-dealers until it was
replaced by FINRA in 2007.29
Almost seventy years later, NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc.
merged to form FINRA, a single regulator for all securities firms

24.

Maloney Act, Pub. L. No. 75-719, § 15A, 52 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1938) (codified as

amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006)) (amending the Exchange Act "[t]o provide for the
establishment of a mechanism of regulation among over-the-counter brokers and dealers").
25.

Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3

(2006)).
26. Id. § 15A(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a)); see also VI Louis LOSS, JOEL
SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 194-95 (4th ed. 2011).

27. Exchange Act § 15A(b)(7)-(8) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6)-(8)).
28. Loss, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 26, at 167-68 (citing Application by Nat'l Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc. for Registration, 5 S.E.C. 627, 627, 633 (1939)).
29. Id at 168 & n.23; Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the
FinancialIndustry, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665, 693-94 (2010); see also infra Parts II.B-C (for the
main discussion regarding the implication of there being only one association on FINRA's
regulatory capabilities). The National Futures Association registered in 1981 and is considered a
limited purpose association. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k).
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conducting business with the public. 30 By that point NASD and NYSE
were the only SROs providing member firm regulation. 31 Firms with
dual membership had to comply with two--often contradictoryrulebooks and pressed for the merger.32 The SEC approved the merger in
order "to help streamline the broker-dealer regulatory system ...[and to
enhance] oversight of U.S. securities firms and assur[e] investor
protection. 33
The extent of FINRA's authority is enormous. The Authority
oversees approximately 4380 brokerage firms, and 633,000 registered
securities representatives. 34 It supervises eighty percent of U.S. equity
trading, monitoring trading on the NYSE, NYSE Arca, NYSE Amex,
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
("NASDAQ") Stock Market, and the International Securities
Exchange.
30. The SEC approved the consolidation of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc. on July 26,
2007. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement
Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm
Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-56,145
(July 26, 2007), 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169, 42,169-70 (Aug. 1, 2007).
31. Consolidation of NASD and the Regulatory Functions of the NYSE: Working Towards
Improved Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 5-6 (2007) [hereinafter NASD/NYSE Consolidation
Hearing] (statement of Erik Sirri, director, Division of Marketing Regulation, Securities and
Exchange Commission). One hundred and seventy of the more than 5000 U.S. broker-dealers
conducting business with the public under the supervision of NASD or NYSE were members of
both organizations. Id.at 6 (statement of Erik Sirri, director, Div. of Mkt. Reg., Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n). NASD provided regulatory oversight by contract for NASDAQ Stock Market, the
American Stock Exchange, and the International Securities Exchange. Id. at 53 (statement of Mary
L. Schapiro, chairman & chief executive officer, NASD); see also Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement Governance and Related Changes to
Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE
Regul ation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-56,145 (July 26, 2007), 72 Fed. Reg. at 42,170.
32. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 637 F.3d 112, 114-15
(2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 (2012); NASD/NYSE Consolidation
Hearing, supra note 31, at 51-53 (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, chairman & chief executive
officer, NASD).
33. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Gives Regulatory Approval for NASD and
NYSE Consolidation (July 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007151 .htm; see also Jeremy Grant, Self-Regulator to Oversee US Broker-Dealers, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Nov. 11-12, 2006, at 21 (reporting SEC Chairman Christopher Cox as saying that prior to the
merger, "investors were suffering amid 'needless costs of multiple rule books, duplicative
inspections and redundant staff"). NYSE member organizations that were not already members of
NASD were required to join FINRA. See Memorandum from Richard Ketchum, Chief Regulatory
Officer, NYSE Regulation to All Members and Member Organizations, No. 07-79 (July 30, 2007),
available at http://www.cecouncil.com/Documents/cOb655be-53bc-4925-b9la-efSdd4Od3556.pdf
Before that, securities dealers who remained on the NYSE did not have to join NASD. See Standard
Inv. Chartered,Inc., 637 F.3d at 114.
34. About FINRA, supra note 1.
35. Id; FINRA 2010 REPORT, supra note 7, at 3, 39. Just as NASD was formerly, the new
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FINRA establishes and administers rules relating to qualifications
for membership.3 6 Its rules extend to the internal operations of its
members, requiring certain net capital, employee oversight, and internal
compliance regimes.37 It arbitrates disputes among FINRA members,
their employees, and customers.38
FINRA administers its rules regarding sales or distributions of
securities including underwriting and compensation arrangements, and
advertising practices. 39 FINRA also enforces Exchange Act provisions
and SEC regulations. 40 It conducts regular and for-cause examinations of
its members and investigates suspected misconduct. 4' It holds
disciplinary proceedings and imposes disciplinary sanctions.42 FINRA

SRO became responsible by contract for the market regulation for NASDAQ Stock Market, the
American Stock Exchange, and the International Securities Exchange. Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement Governance and Related Changes to
Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE
Regulation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-56,145 (July 26, 2007), 72 Fed. Reg. at 42,170. In
2010, NYSE contracted out its market surveillance responsibilities to FINRA as well. BrokerDealers: FINRA Now Developing New System for Cross-MarketSurveilling, Ketchum Says, 43 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2150 (Oct. 24, 2011). "[S]ecurities exchanges maintain listing requirements
for companies issuing securities." Omarova, supra note 29, at 694 n.93.
36. FtN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., By-Laws art. III, in FINRA MANUAL (Wolters Kluwer 2012)
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
available
at
FINRA
MANUAL],
[hereinafter
displaymain.html?rbid=2403&element id=l (use hyperlinks to navigate the various sections of the
Manual online); see FINRA BROCHURE, supra note 6, at 2, 7.
37. SEC Over-the-Counter Markets Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2011) (laying out net
capital requirements for brokers/dealers); FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., Financialand OperationalRules
R. 4110, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36; see id. at Responsibilities Relating to Associated
Persons,Employees, and Others' Employees R. 3010.
38. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Arbitration Overview, FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Overview (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
39. FINRA Brochure, supra note 6, at 3-4.
40. Joseph McLaughlin, Is FINRA Constitutional?,43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 681, 68182 (Mar. 28, 2011).
41. Id.at683-84.
42. Fiero v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 2011). The Exchange Act
requires that FINRA "provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members and persons
associated with members, the denial of membership to any person seeking membership therein, the
barring of any person from becoming associated with a member thereof, and the prohibition or
limitation by the association of any person with respect to access to services offered by the
association or a member thereof." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8) (2006).
Once FINRA issues and files a complaint against a member, the matter goes before a hearing panel
which issues a decision. Code of Procedure R. 9211, 9231, 9268-69, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 36. Members can appeal final decisions to the FINRA National Adjudicatory Council (NAC),
whose decisions can then be appealed to the SEC. Code of Procedure R.9311, 9349(a), 9370, in
FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36; see 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2). The SEC's decision may then be
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a). In sum, parties have multiple
levels available in the appeals process. In re Series 7 Broker Qualification Exam Scoring Litig., 548
F.3d 110, 112-13 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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has almost as many employees as the SEC and its revenues near that of
the SEC's budget authorization. 3
B. FINRA's Rules and SanctioningPolicy
1. Conduct Rules
FINRA's mission is to protect investors and the integrity of the
market "through effective and efficient regulation of the securities
industry."4 The Exchange Act directs that an association's rules be
"designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade. ' 5 While many of the
FINRA rules parallel Exchange Act requirements, FINRA also imposes
on its members the duty to "observe high standards of commercial honor
and just and equitable principles of trade."' 6 FINRA uses this principle
to invalidate manipulative or fraudulent conduct, even where there is no
FINRA or SEC rule speaking to the particular conduct. 47
FINRA also regulates particular member-customer interactions and
transactions.4 8 Members must conform their advertising material to
FINRA's specifications and make certain pre-sale disclosures about their

43. McLaughlin, supra note 40, at 683. In 2009, FINRA booked $1 billion in revenue,
including the $50 million it collected in fines. Id. FINRA has approximately 3300 employees.
F1NRA BROCHURE, supranote 6, at 9.
44. About FINRA, supra note 1. The Exchange Act authorizes FINRA to promulgate rules to
regulate member conduct. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b). F1NRA's duties include:
establishing rules and regulations for FINRA members, including fees and membership
requirements; arbitration of disputes among and between FINRA members, associated
persons, and customers; regulation of public and private sale or distribution of securities
including underwriting arrangements and compensation; establishing policies for
clearance and settlement of securities transactions; review of FINRA member
advertising practices; administration, interpretation and enforcement of FINRA rules;
administration and enforcement of Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board ("MSRB")
rules and federal securities laws; establishing standards of proof for violations and
sanctions imposed on F1NRA members and associated persons in connection with
disciplinary actions; administration of FINRA enforcement and disciplinary programs
including investigation, adjudication of cases and the imposition of fines and other
sanctions; and operation of the Central Registration Depository ("CRD").
1-3 W. REECE BADER, FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 3.05 (Matthew Bender &

Co. 2012).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6).
46. Duties and Conflicts R. 2010, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36.
47. See Duties and Conflicts R. 2020, in FNRA MANUAL, supra note 36 (Fraudulent and
manipulative conduct is regulated under FINRA Rule 2020, which prohibits members from
effecting or inducing any securities transactions by "means of any manipulative, deceptive or other
fraudulent device or contrivance.").
48. Duties and Conflicts R. 2060, 2100-2150, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 40:963

investment products. 49 Each year, FINRA reportedly "reviews more than

90,000 individual advertisements and communications from firms to
investors., 50 Advertising violations was the largest contributor to the
total amount in fines that FINRA imposed in 201 L
FINRA prohibits members from charging excessive mark-ups on
clients' trades. 52 Members must also comply with FINRA's suitability
rule, which prohibits a dealer from recommending a security to the client
unless the dealer has reason to believe that the security is "suitable" to
the client's financial situation and needs 3
2. Sanctions
The Exchange Act and FINRA Rule 8310 authorize FINRA to

impose a number of disciplinary sanctions.54 FINRA may censure, fine,
suspend, or expel members." FINRA can also censure or fine
individuals associated with FINRA members.

6

FINRA may suspend

individuals from associating with members in any or all capacities for a

49. See FINRA BROCHURE, supra note 6, at 3.
50. Id.
51. See Brian L. Rubin et al., Annual SutherlandFINRA Sanctions Survey Shows a 51% Jump
in Fines in 2011, SUTHERLAND (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.sutherland.com/newsevents/News_
Detail.aspx?News=1276750e-5346-4135-bfc0-a7970d87db47. Between 2010 and 2011, the total
amount fined for advertising-related violations grew from approximately $4.75 million to $21.1
million. Id.In 2011, nine cases involving allegedly misleading website advertising materials
accounted for almost $8 million in fines. Id A significant amount of advertising fines over the past
three years have arisen from the sale of auction rate securities. Id.
52. Commissions, Mark-Ups and Charges R. 2440, IM-2440-1, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 36.
53. Duties and Conflicts R. 2310(b)(2), in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36. Suitability-related
cases were among the largest contributors to total fines levied by FINRA in 2010. Deborah G.
Heilizer et al., Annual Sutherland FINRA Sanctions Study Shows Enforcement Actions on the Rise,
SUTHERLAND (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.sutherland.com/newsevents/NewsDetail.aspx?
News=5bf43ef6-elld-4d58-815e-930a7e0183e0. In 2011, FINRA barred thirty individuals for
recommending unsuitable transactions. Deborah G. Heilizer et al., Sutherland Focus Report #4:
FINRA Suitability Sanctions Rise in 2011, SUTHERLAND
(Mar.
16,
2012),
http://www.sutherland.com/newsevents/News Detail.aspx?News=06f6963b-Oa7a-4aaO-9a35-0090
c43a16e7. FINRA has actively developed the suitability rule. See generally FIN. INDUS. REG.
AUTH., PROPOSED RULE CHANGE TO ADOPT FINRA RULES 2090 (KNOw YOUR CUSTOMER) AND

2111 (SUITABILITY) IN THE CONSOLIDATED FINRA RULEBOOK (July 30, 2010), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@rulfil/documents/rulefilings/p121 835.pdf.
The SEC prosecutes suitability rule violations under its anti-fraud provisions. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c)(1) (2006).
54. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (providing for disciplinary measures such as,
"expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure, being
suspended or barred from being associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction"); Sanctions
R. 8310, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7); SanctionsR. 8310, in FINRA MANUAL, supranote 36.
56. Sanctions R. 8310(a)(1)-(2), in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36.
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57
period of time, or contingent on performance of a specific act.
Individuals may also be permanently barred
from associating with a
58
capacities.
all
or
any
in
firm
FINRA member
Sanctions are crafted on a case-by-case basis, but FINRA's
National Adjudicatory Council provides guidelines that offer a range of
appropriate sanctions, as well as factors for FINRA's adjudicators to
consider. 59 The Sanction Guidelines make clear that the purposes of the
sanctions are chiefly to remedy misconduct, prevent the recurrence of
misconduct, and deter future misconduct by others. 60 Adjudicators are
directed to consider the deterrence effect of the sanctions. 61 Recidivists,
for example, are sanctioned more severely than first-time offenders.62
FINRA also uses expulsion to ensure members respect SRO
information requests, examinations, disciplinary decisions, and
arbitration awards.63 FINRA Rule 8210, for example, obligates members
and associated persons to supply information or testimony upon request
and to permit staff to inspect member books and records.64 Failure to

57. Sanctions R. 8310(a)(3), 8311, in FiNRA MANUAL, supra note 36; FIN. INDUS. REG.
AUTH., SANCTION GUIDELINES 3 (2011) [hereinafter FINRA SANCTION GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@sg/documents/industry/pO I1038.pdf.
58. Sanctions R. 8310(a)(5)-(6), 8311, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36; FINRA SANCTION
GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 3.
59. FINRA SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 1 ("These guidelines do not prescribe
fixed sanctions for particular violations .... The guidelines recommend ranges for sanctions and
suggest factors that Adjudicators may consider in determining, for each case, where within the
range the sanctions should fall or whether sanctions should be above or below the recommended
range,").
60. Id. at 2, 10 ("Disciplinary sanctions should be more severe for recidivists.").
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id. Thus, the Guidelines advise adjudicators to design sanctions that are "significant
enough to prevent and discourage future misconduct by a respondent, to deter others from engaging
in similar misconduct, and to modify and improve business practices. Depending on the seriousness
of the violations, Adjudicators should impose sanctions that are significant enough to ensure
effective deterrence." Id. At different points in NASD's and FINRA's disciplinary history, it has
revised its practices in response to perceived shortcomings in the effectiveness of its sanctions to
actually deter misconduct. FINRA's predecessor, NASD, for instance felt that the size of the
penalties it imposed affected the likelihood that its members would comply with its rules. See, e.g.,
Proposed Rule Change Relating to Removal of Fine Limitations, Exchange Act Release No. 3425,883, 41 SEC Docket 405, 405-06 (July 5, 1988). Prior to 1988, NASD's disciplinary fines could
not exceed $15,000 per violation. Id. FINRA removed the ceiling because it found that the amount
was not sufficiently high to effectively deter misconduct. Id; Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change Relating to Removal of Fine Ceilings, Exchange Act Release No.34-25,999, 41 SEC
Docket 868, 869 (Aug. 16, 1988); see also NAT'L ASS'N SEC. DEALERS, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 8875: AMENDMENT ELIMINATING THE FINE LIMITATION IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 95 (Oct.

1988).
63. See Ernest E. Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry Self-Regulation
as We Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351, 1355 (2005) (citing Investigations R. 8210, in FINRA
MANUAL, supra note 36).
64. Investigations R. 8210, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36.
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provide testimony in response to FINRA's formal request is consistently
sanctioned, typically with expulsion.65
The SEC and federal courts have consistently upheld FINRA's
ability to expel members for failing to comply with its investigations.66

They recognize that in the absence of the threat of expulsion, FINRA
would be unable to compel members to cooperate with FINRA
investigations, a critical function for FINRA.67 Members are also

expelled for failure to promptly pay disciplinary fines or costs, as well as
arbitration awards. 68 Failure to comply may be found inconsistent with

just and equitable principles of trade and thus in violation of FINRA
Rule 2010.69

65. See Alan Lawhead, Useful Limits to the Fifth Amendment. Examining the Benefits That
Flow from a Private Regulator's Ability to Demand Answers to Its Questions During an
Investigation, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 210, 213 & n.6 ("FINRA consistently imposes sanctions
on individuals who refuse to provide testimony in response to FINRA's formal request that they do
so. The sanction is typically to bar individuals from associating with any FINRA member firm.").
66. See, e.g., Elliot M. Hershberg, Exchange Act Release No. 34-53,145, 87 SEC Docket 436,
436-39 (ALJ Jan. 19, 2006).
67. Lawhead, supra note 65, at 276. "FINRA's testimony requirement is an essential
investigative tool, and a Registered Person's '[f]ailure to provide information fully and promptly
undermines the NASD's ability to carry out its regulatory mandate."' Id. (quoting Michael David
Borth, 51 S.E.C. 178, 180 (Dec. 16, 1992)); see also PAZ Sec., Inc. & Joseph Mizrachi, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-57,656, 93 SEC Docket (CCH) 47, 49 (Apr. 11, 2008) ("[FINRA's] lack of
subpoena power thus renders compliance with Rule 8210 essential to enable [FINRA] to execute its
self-regulatory functions."), appeal denied, 566 F.3d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Morton Bruce
Erenstein, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56,768, 91 SEC Docket (CCH) 2579, 2585 (Nov. 8, 2007)
(finding it "critically important to the self-regulatory system that members and their associated
persons cooperate with [FINRA] investigations"), appeal denied, 316 F. App'x 865 (11th Cir.
2008); Toni Valentino, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,255, 82 SEC Docket 602, 605 (Feb. 13,
2004) ("[C]ompliance with [NASD's] rules requiring cooperation in investigations is essential to
enable NASD to carry out its self-regulatory functions.").
68. "FINRA may suspend or cancel the membership of any member, or suspend any
associated or formerly associated person from association with any member, for failure to comply
with an arbitration award or with a written and executed settlement agreement obtained in
connection with an arbitration or mediation." SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS: As REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 134 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter SEC STUDY]
(citing By-Laws art. VI§ 3(b), in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36); NAT'L ASS'N SEC. DEALERS,
NOTICE TO MEMBERS 04-57: NON-PAYMENT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 635-36 (Aug. 2004),

available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/
p009798.pdf; see also Awards R. 129040), 139040), in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36, available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf (regarding payment of monetary
awards); Expedited ProceedingsR. 9554, in FINRA MANUAL, supra note 36 (regarding failure to
comply with an award or settlement). In contrast, "[i]nvestment advisers are not subject to such
sanctions." SEC STUDY, supra, at 134.
69. SEC STUDY, supra note 68, at 82 (citing Arbitration Procedure IM-12000, in FINRA
MANUAL, supra note 36); see also Duties and Conflicts R. 2010, in FINRA MANUAL, supra
note 36.
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C. Recent Criticisms of FINRA

FINRA has come under significant criticism for its failure to
prevent or at least detect multiple, large cases of investor fraud that were
uncovered over the course of the recent financial crisis.70 The SEC,
investigating FINRA's monitoring of Bernard Madoff, gave a very
unfavorable review of FINRA's examinations and write-ups. 7'
Some argue that FINRA focuses too closely on small-scale local
scams while ignoring signals of larger trouble occurring on Wall
Street.72 Critics also charged FINRA with going easy on Wall Street,
pointing out the significant drops in the number of disciplinary actions
that FINRA filed, as well as in the amount of fines FINRA levied,
during the financial crisis.73 Since 2008, the number of FfNRA
disciplinary actions has actually increased each year.74 The 2009 Special
Review Committee, established by FINRA's board, cited information
70. See Ben Protess, From Defending to Policing Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan.
17, 2011, 8:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/from-defending-to-policing-wallstreet/ [hereinafter Protess, Policing]; see, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS,
INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME 175-77
(Aug. 31, 2009) [hereinafter SEC INVESTIGATION], available at http://www.see.gov/news/studies/
2009/oig-509.pdf.
71. See SEC INVESTIGATION, supra note 70, at 176.
72. See Protess, Policing, supra note 70.
73. "At the height of the crisis in 2008, FINRA filed 1,073 disciplinary actions, down from
1,204 two years before. Last year, FINRA brought 1,310 cases, but levied $41 million in fines,
roughly half what it collected in 2006." Id. Susan Merrill, a former FINRA enforcement chief,
responded by stating that simply counting numbers is not the right way to judge. Id. FINRA barred
329 individuals in 2011, an increase of more than 14% from 2010, when FINRA barred 288
individuals. Rubin et al., supra note 51. FINRA levied fines totaling $68 million in 2011, a 51%
increase from fines levied in 2010, which amounted to $45 million. Id.NASD levied $38.8 million
in 1997; $27.9 million in 1998; $40.3 million in 1999; and $14.3 million in 2000. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEC AND CFTC: MOST FINES COLLECTED, BUT IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
THE USE OF TREASURY'S COLLECTION SERVICE 10 tbl.2 (July 2001). [hereinafter GAO REPORT],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01900.pdf. The amount FINRA levies has increased
dramatically:
The number of FINRA's "supersized" fines ($1 million or more) has dwindled in recent
years, from 19 reported in both 2006 and 2007, to ten in 2009, and only six in 2010.
Although the number of these large fines grew only to ten in 2011, the total amount of
these fines exploded from $14.2 million in 2010 to more than $35 million in 2011. This
includes five fines of at least $3 million and a short selling case that resulted in a $12
million fine.
Rubin et al., supra note 51. FINRA "ordered more than $19 million in restitution to harmed
investors." About FINRA, supra note 1.
74. See Rubin et al., supra note 51; see also Deborah G. Heilizer et al., Annual Review of
FINRA Sanctions Finds Disciplinary Slowdown Began to Reverse in 2009, WALL ST. LAW., Aug.
2010, at 1, available at http://www.sutherland.com/files/Publication/466dfb40-6f36-49bd-840bfc2ab8d7f7c4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2770c97c- 19ca-4f33-ba68-3a9e4I e08aaa/2010
%20D%20%2OHeilizer%/20B%20%2oRubin%20S%20%2OGillespie%20-%2OAnnual%20Review
%20o/o2OFINRA 20Sanctions %20Finds /o20Disci.pdf.
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barriers that made it difficult for FINRA to detect the scandals. 75 The
report recommended that FINRA have greater access to the SEC's
data.76 It also recommended that FINRA have jurisdiction over SECregistered Investment Advisors.77 The day the report was published,
FINRA announced that it78 was establishing an Office of Fraud Detection
and Market Intelligence.
FINRA has also protested that its effectiveness should not be
measured by the number of disciplinary actions it files or the dollar
amount it fines. 79 FINRA coordinates investigations with and often does
much behind-the-scenes work for cases that are ultimately prosecuted by
the SEC.80 In 2010, FINRA referred 500 cases of suspected fraud to the
SEC and other federal enforcement agencies.8 1

Ill. MONOPOLY AND MARKET POWER BY DESIGN
A.

Effectiveness of a Self-Regulatory System
Based on SROs' Market Power

1. Exchanges
The self-regulatory framework established by the Exchange Act
was predicated on member-run organizations with (1) a self-interest in
ensuring fair and orderly markets, and (2) sufficient monopoly over
listing firms to make the threat of expulsion costly enough to garner the
compliance of their members.82 Long before the Exchange Act, the

75. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. SPECIAL REVIEW COMM., REPORT OF THE 2009 SPECIAL
REVIEW COMMITTEE ON FINRA's EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF THE STANFORD AND
MADOFF SCHEMES 1, 3-6 (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter SPECIAL REVIEW COMM. REPORT], available at

http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/documents/corporate/p120078.pdf.
76. Id. at 75.
77. Id. at 71-72.
78. Ben Protess, For Wall Street Watchdog, All Grunt Work, Little Glory, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Dec. 1, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/for-wall-streetwatchdog-all-grunt-work-little-glory [hereinafter Protess, Watchdog]. The office had 130 people as
of December 2011, about a year after the task force was established. Id.
79. See Protess, Policing,supra note 70.
80. See Protess, Watchdog, supra note 78. Cameron Funkhouser, an executive vice president
and head of FINRA's Office of Fraud Detection and Market Intelligence has said about FINRA:
We're a clearinghouse of regulatory
"We identify the dots so other people can connect them ....
intelligence." d.
81. Id. This would suggest that compounded with the Second Circuit decision, FINRA's
enforcement work may be a distraction from the real value they could offer.
82. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling SelfRegulation and the NationalMarket System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1090-95 (2005) [hereinafter
Dombalagian, Demythologizing]. "In the context of stock exchanges, the grant of self-regulatory
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83
member-owned exchanges had a system in place for self-regulation.
Congress mobilized to reign in the self-dealing behavior of the
exchanges, while exploiting their ability to exercise market power over
their members.84

authority was premised on the ability of the exchange to exercise dominant market power in specific
securities or geographic areas." Id. at 1091. Congress understood that:
The concept of self-regulation is premised upon an exchange's ability to use its market
power for regulatory purposes, mainly by threatening individual members and listed
issuers with termination of their contractual arrangements in case of noncompliance with
the rules of the 'club.' Using the same power to achieve less public-minded goals is
simply the other side of the same coin; while the potential for abuse is disquieting, selfregulation would not be successful without the stick of dominant stock exchange power.
Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80 S.CAL. L. REv. 1239,
1254 (2007).
83. Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1246-47 ("Exchanges constituted an attempt by a
group of brokers to take control of trading in certain equities so as to offer more streamlined trading
conditions through increased liquidity in exchange for a fee."). Before the Exchange Act, the
exchanges worked to set up the market by seeking "to control the trading members, the stocks to be
traded among them, and the rules under which trading would take place." Id.at 1246. They
established eligibility criteria and market supervision to ensure reliable trading partners and remove
potentially deceitful partners. See id. at 1247. The exchanges also maintained listing standards so
that stocks traded on their exchanges would act as a signal of quality which would then work to
retain issuing firms. See id. Gadinis and Jackson explained:
Often, exchanges promulgated rules relating to clearing and settlement of transactions
executed through their facilities. In addition, exchanges often undertook a policing role
over their markets, monitoring compliance with trading rules, supervising day-to-day
trading to identify instances of potential fraudulent or abusive behavior, and often
undertaking enforcement actions against their members.
Id.at 1248. Macey and Kanda write that:
Confining all trading to a centralized location at which trading patterns can be
scrutinized greatly facilitates the ability of the markets to monitor breaches of fiduciary
duties by officers and directors. Where monitoring and detecting insider trading is easier,
the costs of such activity will be higher, and the incidence of the activity will be lower.
Thus, organized stock exchanges can reduce agency costs associated with the separation
of ownership and control within large, publicly held firms by lowering the costs of
monitoring certain breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders.
Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close
Substitutesfor the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1007, 1021 (1990)
(footnote omitted).
84. Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1075-76 ("Congress specifically
expressed concern over the manipulation and control of quotes and trade information disseminated
by the exchanges and over-the-counter markets, as well as the impact of excessive speculation in
securities on interstate commerce."). Congress sought to alter the exchanges so that they no longer
ran like "private clubs to be conducted only in accordance with the interests of their members," but
as "public institutions which the public is invited to use for the purchase and sale of securities listed
thereon." H.R. REP,. No. 73-1383, at 15 (1934). "The Exchange Act contained provisions designed
to prevent known manipulative practices in the exchange and over-the-counter markets, as well as to
regulate exchange members' trading activity and conflicts of interest." Dombalagian,
Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1075. The final legislation was partly the result of compromise
with the strongly opposed and powerful industry lobby. See Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at
1250. However, there were practical reasons for trying to tweak the system that was already in place
instead of attempting to build a whole new framework. Id. at 1249-51. The SEC lacked capacity to
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Under the Exchange Act, the SEC was authorized to register
"national securities exchanges" that were to enforce their members'
compliance with the Exchange Act and SEC regulations.85 Exchanges
were to promulgate and enforce rules promoting "just and equitable
principles of trade," and provide procedures for disciplining member
misconduct.86 Congress believed it was in the exchanges' interest to
ensure fair and orderly markets in order to attract and retain issuers.87
oversee trading, stockbrokers, and the listing firms on their own. See Joel Seligman, Cautious
Evolution or Perennial Irresolution:Stock Market Self-Regulation During the FirstSeventy Years
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 BUS. LAW. 1347, 1347 (2004). "To avoid the
'impracticality of a burgeoning bureaucracy' that would be 'in danger of breaking down under its
own weight and proving ineffective,' Congress settled upon a self-regulatory framework for
regulating the activities of stock exchange members." Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note
82, at 1075-76 (quoting Securities Industry Study: Report of the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, S. DOc. NO. 93-13, at 139 (1973) (citation omitted)). The
SEC and Congress also recognized that the industry's superior expertise was needed to ensure that
the Exchange Act and SEC rules were developed and implemented with as little disruption to the
markets as possible. Seligman, supra, at 1347; see also 54 Julia Black, Decentring Regulation:
Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory World,' in
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 115 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., 2001). The argument is somewhat limited
in its applicability to today's markets, although it continues to be offered. The position assumes that
the SROs providing oversight are actually governed by industry participants and not by full-time
staff. See Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1250. It also may be less applicable as the areas of
oversight delegated to SROs, such as FINRA, have broadened to encompass review of non-market
issues, such as the financial statements of members. Id. Another benefit was that as nongovernmental entities, SROs could adopt standards higher than those set by federal securities law,
prohibiting behavior inconsistent with just and equitable principles. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The
Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (1997).
85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a), (b)(1) (2006).
86. Id § 78f(b)(6)-(7).
87. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation
in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 570 (2005). Macey and O'Hara explain:
Because market participants were quite homogeneous, there was a significant
convergence of interests between exchanges and members with respect to regulation.
What was perceived as being in the interests of exchange members was also perceived as
being good for the development of the market. And, in turn, what was perceived as being
good for the market was also perceived as being good for investors and issuers.
Id.Macey and Kanda add:
Over time, stock exchanges have developed significant reputational capital that is of
value to listing firms. It is very costly for potential investors to obtain information about
all of the companies that present attractive investment opportunities. Listing on an
exchange can provide a valuable filter to investors, informing them that the securities
listed are of high quality.
This signalling service is valuable to issuers as well as investors. Issuers find it
costly to make credible assurances to potential investors that their securities are of high
quality.
Macey & Kanda, supra note 83, at 1023 (footnote omitted). "As monopolists, exchanges had a
strong economic incentive to pass rules that would increase the overall size of the markets for listed
securities, as this would increase the exchanges' overall monopoly profits." Macey & O'Hara,
supra, at 570. "Exchanges may come to acquire dominant market power because the aggregation of
liquidity creates a natural monopoly or because members naturally benefit from economies of scale
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The market power that the exchanges wielded over their members would
ensure that their members conducted their businesses according to just
and equitable principles of trade.88 The exchanges' market power in
securities enabled the threat of expulsion to garner compliance with
Exchange Act provisions, SEC regulations, and the exchanges' own
89
rules.
Congress sought to protect the exchanges' monopoly status, which
was necessary to ensure that all securities trading activity was monitored
by the designated SROs and so that the threat of expulsion for rule
violations would keep exchange members in line. 90 The existence of an
OTC market as an unregulated alternative to the exchanges threatened
the self-regulatory model. 91 Both the Senate and House reports
accompanying the respective bills that were to become the Exchange Act
indicated concern that a lack of regulation in OTC trading would 92attract
issuing and trading away from the exchanges to escape regulation.
or standardization of terms." Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1091. Gadinis and
Jackson explain:
These rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement efforts allowed stock exchanges to
develop a 'brand'; listing on the NYSE, for example, confirmed that an issuer was able
to meet some of the highest corporate standards on a global scale. The exchange offered
to listed companies a 'panoply of rules' to govern their activities. The importance of a
brand for an exchange lies in the brand's ability to attract revenue. The NYSE and
NASDAQ, for example, have traditionally intensely competed with one another for
listing fees. Such competition has recently expanded to competition for trading fees and
fees from the sale of market trading information.
Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1248.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5); Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1090-92.
89. Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1248; Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note
82, at 1091. Gadinis and Jackson explained:
As stock exchange regulatory power was, at least initially, based on contract, the
exchanges' sanctioning abilities were structured in a contract-like manner. As such,
discontinuation of the contract often constituted the harshest measure over the regulated
entity, which was either a trading member or a listed firm. Consequently, the exchange
had the power to devise less strict measures that addressed the particular concerns
associated with the behavior in question.
Gadinis & Jackson, supranote 82, at 1248. Dombalagian added:
Self-regulatory organizations enforce their rules and the federal securities laws using the
sanctions available to them-denial of membership and its privileges. While such
powers carry with them the threat of anticompetitive behavior, it is the exchange's
monopoly power that also gives it the ability to carry out its self-regulatory mission.
Dombalagian, Demythologizing,supra note 82, at 1091.
90. See Dombalagian, Demythologizing,supra note 82, at 1090-92.
91. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be
ConsideredGovernment Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 151, 162 (2008) [hereinafter Karmel,
Securities SROs] (explaining that "self-regulation was called.into question by stock market abuses,
especially in the OTC market").
92. The House report accompanying the bill that was to become the 1934 Act explained that
the over-the-counter markets "are of vast proportions and they would serve as a refuge for any
business that might seek to escape the discipline of the exchanges; and the more exacting that
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As a practical matter, because the OTC market was outside the
exchanges' jurisdictions, the fraudulent trading behavior that the
Exchange Act sought to address by delegating supervisory authority to
the exchanges would continue unmonitored. 93 Moreover, the threat of
expulsion from the exchanges would weaken as a deterrent if members
no longer needed to transact securities on exchanges. 94 As a potential
fallout, the exchanges would be disincentivized from enforcing their
rules, as enforcement would lead to greater migration to the OTC
market. 95
2. National Securities Associations
In 1938, Congress passed the Maloney Act, which extended selfregulation to the OTC market. 96 The new Section 15A of the Exchange
Act directed the Commission to register national securities associations
to supervise its member broker-dealers that were not members of an
exchange that would be under the SEC's ultimate supervision.97
Congress took the system of exchange self-regulation as its
model. 98 In crafting the self-regulatory system, the drafters sought to
discipline, the greater the temptation to escape from it." H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 15-16 (1934)
(citation omitted). The Senate report echoed this sentiment, seeing the need to "forestall widespread
evasion of stock exchange regulation by the withdrawal of securities from listing on exchanges, and
by transferring trading therein to 'over-the-counter' markets where manipulative evils could
continue to flourish, unchecked by any regulatory authority." S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934); see
also 15 DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER DEALER REGULATION § 1:3 (2012).
93. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 16 (citation omitted) (explaining that through the Exchange
Act, Congress permitted the Commission to require the registration of broker-dealers that were not
members of an exchange and that transacted in over-the-counter securities, because "[t]o leave the
over-the-counter markets out of a regulatory system would be to destroy the effects of regulating the
organized exchanges"); see also LIPTON, supra note 92, at § 1:3.
94. See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (noting that companies would evade stock exchange
regulation by simply transferring securities to OTC markets).
95. See id.; see also LIPTON, supra note 92, at § 1:3.
96. Pub. L. No. 75-719, § 15A, 52 Star. 1070, 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006)).
97. Id. In a 1936 prelude to the eventual Maloney Act, the SEC obtained authority to
"regulate broker-dealers for record keeping and financial responsibility and to prohibit fraudulent
activity in the over-the-counter market." Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1076
n.35; see also LIPTON, supra note 92, at § 1:1.
98. See LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 26, at 160 (citing 83 CONG. REC. 4451
(1938) (statement of Sen. Francis T. Maloney)); S. REP. NO. 75-1455, at 3-4 (1938); H.R. REP. No.
75-2307, at 4-5 (1938)). Like the exchange framework, the OTC model would be one of cooperative
regulation:
in which the [regulatory] task will be largely performed by representative organizations
of investment bankers, dealers, and brokers, with the Government exercising appropriate
supervision in the public interest, and exercising supplementary powers of direct
regulation. In the concept of a really well organized and well-conducted stock exchange,
under the supervision provided by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, one may
perceive something of the possibilities of such a program.
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replicate the economic effect of expulsion from the SRO exchanges. 99
The Maloney Act enabled national securities associations to increase the
value of membership and thus compel OTC brokers to join by allowing
associations to promulgate a rule allowing members to deal on
preferential terms with each other while prohibiting members "from
dealing with nonmember broker-dealers except on the same terms as are
accorded to the general public."' 0 0 As the Senate report explained:
[I]t is contemplated that exclusion from membership in a registered
securities association will be attended and implemented by economic
sanctions. In this respect, exclusion from such an association would be
comparable in effect to expulsion from a national securities exchange.
It is these economic sanctions which
would make possible effective
10 1
discipline within the association.

According to the SEC, the provision made it "virtually impossible
for a dealer who is not a member of the NASD to participate in a
distribution of important size.' 1 2 Roberta Karmel credits
the preferential
10 3
terms as the main reason for membership in NASD.
In 1939, NASD became the first and only securities association to
register with the SEC to oversee broker-dealers in the OTC market. 0 4
Although the Act provided for the registration of multiple associations,
academics have suggested that the Act's drafters never intended that
more than one association be formed, and that "[t]he SEC itself
encouraged the formation of a single, national association."'0 5 In 1955,

S. REP. No. 75-1455, at 4; H.R.REP. No. 75-2307, at 4-5. In important ways though, the Maloney
Act constrained NASD's ability to engage in anticompetitive behavior-much more than the
original Act constrained that of the exchanges. Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 82, at
1077. For instance, NASD was not allowed to impose a schedule of prices or fix minimum
commissions. Id.
NASD's role was narrower and SEC's leash on the association was shorter. Id.
99. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2006).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(e); Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1077; Karmel,
Securities SROs, supra note 91, at 161-62 ('[M]uch of what held the NASD together was the
economic self-interest of securities dealers in structuring the trading rules for the OTC market.").
FINRA no longer operates the OTC market, which was organized into NASDAQ in 1971 and then
separated from NASD, into a public company and registered with the SEC as a stock exchange. Id.
at 161.
101. S.REP. NO. 75-1455, at 3-4.
102. Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 441 (1945).
103. See Karmel, Securities SROs, supranote 91, at 162.
104. See Loss, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 26, at 168 & n.23; Dombalagian,
Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1077 n.36; Karmel, Securities SROs, supranote 91, at 159, 161.
105. Loss, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 26, at 168 n.21 (citing H.R. DOc. No. 88-95,
pt.4, at 606 (1963)); BADER, supra note 44, at § 3.05 n.3. The Maloney Act contemplated multiple
SROs registering. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation, supra note 14, at 348. The National
Futures Association ("NFA"), formed for the limited purpose of regulating futures products, was the
second association to apply for registration, sixty years after NASD. LOSs, SELIGMAN & PAREDES,
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the Executive Director of the NASD testified that its membership
"covered practically every one that was in the securities business, as we
10 6
know it.'
Over the years, the SEC and Exchange Act amendments expanded
the class of broker-dealers required to register with a national securities
association.10 7 The last exemptions were removed in 1983.1 08 Today, the
Exchange Act requires that all brokers and dealers required to register
with the SEC must also register with a national securities association in
order to effect any transactions in securities.10 9
B.

GOVERNMENT RESTRAINTS ON ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR AND
NEW COMPETITION UNDERMINE EXCHANGES' ABILITY
TO EXERCISE MARKET POWER

1. Anti-Competitive Behavior Restrained
Since the passage of the Exchange Act, governmental efforts to
restrain the exchanges' perceived anti-competitive behavior and the
emergence of non-exchange as well as international trading venues have
supra note 26, at 168 n.23. "But it was clear that another association might be formed." Id. at 168
n.21 (citing S. Rep. No. 88-379, at 49-50 (1963)).
106. Loss, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 26, at 168, 170 (quoting Amendments to
Securities Act of 1933 (Exemptions): Hearings on H.R. 5701 and H.R. 9319 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong. IV, 682
(1956) (internal quotation marks omitted) (testimony of Wallace H. Fulton, Executive Director,
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.).
107. Even before the Maloney Act, the new registration requirements in the 1936 amendments
broadened the scope of broker-dealers required to register under SEC's rules. See David A Lipton, A
Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899, 902-03 (1987). The rules had
initially focused on brokers and dealers that made markets in over-the-counter securities or used
such facilities to transact. Id. This distinction was removed in the amendments-after the 1936
amendments codifying the SEC's rules requiring registration of OTC brokers and dealers, the
Commission required even exchange members to register if they merely engaged in over-thecounter transactions. See id.at 903. "The Commission interpreted § 15(a) as authority to require
registration of any broker or dealer who engaged in any over-the-counter transaction, whether or not
that broker or dealer was an exchange member." Id. at 903 n.13. "Many stocks, whether listed or
unlisted, as well as virtually all bonds and government securities, traded in the 'over-the-counter'
market... " Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1076 n.35.
108. See Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change: Conversion of
SECO Broker/Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 20,273, 28 SEC Docket 1366, 1366-67 (Oct. 12,
1983) (converting SECO broker-dealers (i.e., those who were registered with the SEC) into
members of NASD). Congress had previously allowed some investment companies that had
"objected strenuously to the principle of compulsory membership in any trade association" to be
regulated by the SEC directly. LoSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 26, at 193 (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 88-1418, at 2-3 (1964)).
109. LIPTON, supra note 92, at § 1:3 & n.2. "The act also provides that the SEC may exempt
from registration any broker or dealer, or class of brokers or dealers." 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities
Regulation-Federal§ 335 (2008); see, e.g., LIPTON, supra note 92, at § 1:3.
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undermined the ability of the exchanges to regulate themselves.11 ° The
inherent conflict of interest in the member-owned exchanges acting as
regulators over themselves continued to irk Congress and the SEC."' In
a number of instances over the years, the exchanges proved lax in
fulfilling their regulatory mission and were even complicit in
marketplace misconduct, using their regulatory power to promote
members' interests.1 2 Many saw the exchanges, particularly the NYSE,
as using their regulatory power to prevent competition.1 1 3 For example,
for many years the NYSE prohibited its members from trading NYSElisted stock in the OTC market. 14 The control of NYSE's management
by specialists explained to many the reason why specialists remained
long after trading technology should have made them obsolete.15

110. See Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation, supranote 14, at 328, 331-32.
111. See Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50,700,
69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,258-59 (Dec. 8, 2004) ("Likewise, numerous recent SRO failings related to
governance, member oversight and trading supervision raise significant concerns about the efficacy
of the self-regulatory model.").
112. See id.at 71,258. According to a 1973 report of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities:
The inherent limitations in allowing an industry to regulate itself are well known:
the natural lack of enthusiasm for regulation on the part of the group to be
regulated, the temptation to use a facade of industry regulation as a shield to ward
off more meaningful regulation, the tendency for businessmen to use collective
action to advance their interests through the imposition of purely anticompetitive
restraints as opposed to those justified by regulatory needs, and a resistance to
changes in the regulatory pattern because of vested economic interests in its
preservation.
Seligman, supra note 84, at 1347 (quoting S. DOc. No. 93-13, at 145 (1973)). The U.S. government
has nonetheless continued to delegate significant regulatory authority to them. Karmel, Securities
SROs, supra note 91, at 162. Karmel explained:
Although the efficacy of self-regulation was called into question by stock market
abuses, especially in the OTC market, the 1963 SEC Special Study concluded that selfregulation should be maintained and strengthened. Self-regulation was similarly
questioned in the mid 1970s, but the Securities Act Amendments of 1975 continued the
role of stock exchanges and the NASD as SROs.
Id.
113. Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1253-56 (explaining the perceived "potential for
conflicts of interest inherent in a grant of regulatory powers to an organization representing,
essentially, the regulated entities themselves" and that "self-regulation acts as a shield 'insulating'
the industry it purports to regulate from government intervention that enhances investor protection,
albeit at a cost to industry members"). "In the United States, there has been a long history of
controversies over perceived anticompetitive practices, whereby major exchanges, particularly the
NYSE, exploited their market power to extract monopoly rents." Id. at 1254 (citing Gordon v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 660-61, 665-66, 681-82 (1975); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc.,
373 U.S. 341, 343-45, 359-60 (1963)).
114. Seligman, supra note 84, at 1365 (discussing "NYSE Rule 394, later Rule 390, which in
effect prohibited NYSE members from trading NYSE issued stocks in the over the counter ('OTC')
market"); see Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1254-55.
115. Gadinis & Jackson, supranote 82, at 1254-55. Gadinis and Jackson continued:
According to some scholars, the central part that specialists have maintained on the floor
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Over the years, the exchanges, including NASDAQ,' 1 6 were forced
to abandon rules that enabled them to maintain monopolies.' 17 The 1975
Exchange Act amendments sought to facilitate the development of a
National Market System, the objective of which was to maximize
competition among market members, between exchanges and brokerdealers.' 18 After the market-making price collusion scandal on
NASDAQ" 9 and the NYSE specialist misconduct, 120 both markets were
of the NYSE illustrates the following scenario: specialists, which have managed to
survive by virtue of the NYSE mutual ownership structure that allows specialists to
control NYSE management, are part of an outdated institution surpassed by modem
trading designs.
Id.
116. With the Commission's encouragement, NASD developed the NASDAQ system in 1971
to coordinate over-the-counter trading in a centralized system. Christopher W. Cole, Note,
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): Is the Consolidation of NASD and the
Regulatory Arm of NYSE a Bull or a Bearfor US. Capital Markets?, 76 UMKC L. REv. 251, 256
(2007). Until then, NASD had exclusively been a regulatory organization. See id at 255.
117. See Roger D. Blanc, Intermarket Competition and Monopoly Power in the U.S. Stock
Markets, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 287 (2007); Karmel, Securities SROs, supra note
91, at 162.
118. Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulatory
and StructuralIssues and a Reform Proposalto Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
399, 411-12. NMS was designed to achieve:
(i) economically efficient execution of securities transactions;
(ii) fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and
between exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets;
(iii) the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information with respect to
quotations for and transactions in securities;
(iv) the practicability of brokers executing investors' orders in the best market; and
(v) an opportunity, consistent with the provisions of clauses (i) and (iv) of this
subparagraph, for investors' orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C) (2006). To achieve that, Congress felt
that it was necessary to optimize competition among exchanges and to prevent the exchanges from
exercising monopolistic control over information (e.g., market data). See Blanc, supra note 117, at
287. Blanc explained:
In fashioning the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, which added the national market
system provisions in section 1 A of the Exchange Act, the Congress was alert[ed] to the
risk that exchanges, as government-protected monopolies, could exert monopoly power
over market data. It warned that the exchanges-if allowed to continue to have
monopoly powers-should be regulated as public utilities ....
Id. The 1975 amendments increased the SEC's oversight of the SROs, prohibiting certain anticompetitive behavior, requiring greater independence of its governance leaders, and requiring
separation of market and regulatory functions. The SEC was also given authority to initiate and
approve SRO rule-making, and to participate, monitor, and even enforce SRO enforcement and
discipline. Karmel, Securities SROs, supra note 91, at 162. The amendments also addressed SRO
board composition, requiring that there be at least one independent board member that represents
issuers and investors. Id.
119. In 1994, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division investigated "the possibility of
anticompetitive practices in the over-the-counter stock market." Id (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). After the Department of Justice and the SEC discovered an extensive
market-maker price fixing scheme on NASDAQ, NASD was forced to separate its market and
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required to separate their regulatory arms from their market operations,
leading to the increasing bureaucratization of industry self-regulation
and independence from market-centered incentives.121 The exchanges
regulatory operations into two subsidiaries-NASDAQ and NASD Regulation, Inc. ("NASDR").
Seligman, supra note 84, at 1369-72. The 1995 NASD Select Committee on Structure and
Governance found that "regulation of the broker-dealer profession should otherwise be separated
from and performed independently of regulation of the NASDAQ and other OTC markets." NAT'L
Ass'N SEC. DEALERS, INC., NOTICE 95-84: RUDMAN COMMITTEE RELEASES SUMMARY OF
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (1995). The Commission later instituted administrative
proceedings against NASD in 1996, alleging OTC market-maker pricing collusion. Order Instituting
Public Proceedings Pursuant to Section 19(h)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making
Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37,538, 62 SEC Docket
1346, 1346-47 (Aug. 8, 1996). The Commission was particularly distressed by the lack of
independence of the NASD regulatory staff from NASDAQ's market operations. See id.;
SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF

1934 REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ MARKET 40-46 (1996) [hereinafter SECTION
21 (A) REPORT]; see also Report Pursuant to Section 21 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release No. 37,542, (Aug. 8, 1996),
available at 1996 WL 452691 at *2 (finding that NASD was "unduly influenced by NASDAQ
market making firms with respect to rulemaking, the disciplinary process and the admission of new
members"). In his memoir, SEC Director Arthur Levitt admitted that the SEC had "failed to see that
the NASD had gradually been taken over by a cabal of dealers who used the NASD's disciplinary
process to punish certain players, such as day traders, while failing to prosecute serious infractions
by market-makers." ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 184 (2002). The restructuring of NASD
was part of the settlement arising from the SEC action against NASD. SECTION 21(A) REPORT,
supra, at 50-55; NASD sold NASDAQ in 2000 and 2001 after years of investigation into and
complaints about the inherent conflict of interest. Cole, supra note 116, at 257.
120. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Att'y, S.D.N.Y., 15 Current and Former Registered Specialists
of the N.Y. Stock Exch. Indicted on Federal Securities Fraud Charges (Apr. 12, 2005),
available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Apfi15/specialistindictmentpr.pdf.
Widespread violations of federal securities law by NYSE specialists were uncovered in the early
2000s. Like NASD, NYSE underwent a number of governance reforms to increase the
independence of its board and segregate its market and regulatory operations. Order to Reform the
Governance and Management Architecture of the Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,946
(Dec. 17, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 74,678, 74,678-79 (Dec. 24, 2003); Concept Release Concerning
Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50,700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,260 (Dec. 8, 2004)
("Recently, the NYSE changed its governance structure to reduce conflicts of interest with respect
to members. Specifically, the NYSE created a wholly independent board and regulatory staff that
report to an independent board committee." (footnote omitted)). When NYSE merged with
Archipelago Holdings, Inc. ("Arca") shortly thereafter, NYSE's regulatory functions were moved
into a separate not-for-profit subsidiary. Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment Nos.
6 and 8 Relating to the NYSE's Business Combination with Archipelago Holdings, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 34-53,382 (Feb. 27, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,254-55 (Mar. 6, 2006). NYSE
was demutualized and made a public company through its merger with Arca. Id.
121. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-50,699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,129-31 (proposed Dec. 8, 2004) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249); Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation, supra note 14, at333 ("The
Commission has also proposed to revamp the rules of exchange governance to require greater
transparency and segregation of the regulatory and trading operations of SROs."); Order Granting
Accelerated Approval to Amendment Nos. 6 and 8 Relating tothe NYSE's Business Combination
with Archipelago Holdings, Inc., 71 Fed. Reg. at 11,252; Badway & Busch, supra note 63, at
1369-70 ("[A]ny legitimate reforms to the SRO system must begin by separating the market from
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were required to give up their rule requiring consolidation of order flow
through them, mandatory minimum commission schedules, off-board
trading prohibitions, and restrictions on the delisting of firms."' 2 Once
the exchanges were prohibited from mandating consolidation of order
flow through their facilities or restricting their members from off-board
trading, the exchanges were effectively deprived of their ability to
23
discipline their members.
2. Exchanges Lose Market Share to Competition
The U.S. markets and their traditional securities exchanges faced
increasing competition from alternative trading systems ("ATSs") and
cross-border markets. 24 The NYSE, once boasting seventy-seven

regulatory functions."); Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1263 ("While the solutions each
proposal favors are very different, they all share a common underlying rationale: to alleviate
conflicts of interest by segregating market operation from market regulation."). A similar scenario
played out in the UK, where the government abandoned its self-regulatory framework. Id.at 1256
("In the late 1990s, the U.K. government felt that the SRO system generated such complexity and
inefficiency that it decided to transfer SRO regulatory powers to the Federal Securities
Administration (the 'FSA').").
122. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation, supra note 14, at 328 ("[O]ver the past seventy
years the Commission has cajoled or required the primary exchanges to abandon mandatory
minimum commission schedules, off-board trading prohibitions (both with respect to other
exchanges and the over-the-counter market), and restrictions on the ability of management or
shareholders to delist companies from an exchange."); see also Beny, supra note 118, at 412;
Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV.
325, 347-52 (2001); Omarova, supra note 29, at 695-96.
123. See Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation, supra note 14, at 328. Dombalagian
explained:
[T]he Commission's significant rulemaking in the area of market structure has
considerably undermined the autonomy of exchanges to regulate the structure of their
own market operations. The justification for conferring disciplinary authority on
exchanges is their comprehensive ability to oversee and control participation in trading
through their facilities; the power to exclude subsumes the power to discipline. Once
exchanges are no longer able-or permitted-to mandate consolidation of order flow
through their facilities, the source of self-regulatory authority wanes considerably.
Id.Macey and Kanda add:
[E]ven so-called off-board trading restrictions, which prohibit exchange members from
trading shares in listed securities in the over-the-counter market, are eroding. SEC Rule
19c-3 prohibits exchanges from restricting secondary market trading for shares listed on
an exchange after April 26, 1979. For these stocks, the NYSE faces potential
competition from the over-the-counter markets for trading volume because members can
begin making markets for over-the-counter shares in these firms. This competition serves
as a real constraint on the ability of the NYSE to exercise market power over certain
listed firms.
Macey & Kanda, supra note 83, at 1025 (footnotes omitted).
124. See Beny, supra note 118, at 469; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, FS REGULATORY
BRIEF: NEW SEC RULE 15C3-5 BANS UNFILTERED MARKET ACCESS, CREATES NEW CEO
CERTIFICATION, RISK MANAGEMENT, SUPERVISORY AND COMPLIANCE, AND OPERATIONAL

OBLIGATIONS FOR BROKER-DEALERS 1-2 (2011), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-
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percent of all U.S. equity trading, is facing increasing competition from
alternative trading systems and international exchanges. 25 This trend has
heightened concerns that the SRO system, in its present 26form, is no
longer capable of garnering the compliance of its members.
Exchanges, which, as SROs, oversaw the trading activities of their
members, no longer dominate trading.1 27 Brokers and broker-dealers can
now provide "marketplaces for securities themselves, establishing
' 28
electronic trading networks outside of traditional stock exchanges.'

services/regulatory-services/publications/assetsfFS-Reg-Brief-sponsored-access.pdf. "In 1998, the
SEC adopted Rule 3b-16 to define which automated trading systems were exchanges, and
Regulation ATS to exempt certain automated trading systems from registration as an exchange,
subject to conditions that applied the core elements of exchange regulation to exempted 'alternative
trading systems."' DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, CURRENT MARKET STRUCTURE ISSUES IN THE

U.S. EQUITY AND OPTIONS MARKETS 2 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.finra.org/
web/groups/industry/@ip/@edu/@mat/documents/education/pl26207.pdf. As early as 1990,
Jonathan Macey and Hideki Kanda brought to light the development of services that were
substitutable for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges. Macey & Kanda, supra note 83, at
1008-09 ("[A] variety of market devices that previously seemed wholly unrelated to the exchanges
are in fact close substitutes for those offered by the exchange .... [T]he exchanges face significant
competition for the services they offer.").
125. Macey & Kanda, supra note 83, at 1024 ("NYSE clearly enjoys a dominant position
among U.S. securities exchanges. 'The value of trading on the NYSE represents 77% of total value
of U.S. equity trading activity,' and is three times greater than the trading value of any other U.S.
exchange."); see also Jeremy Grant, Sweeping Changes Are on the Way, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009,
at 3; Michael MacKenzie, High Frequency Trading Dominates the Debate, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2009, at 3. The SEC described the situation in its 2004 Concept Release, which proposed an
overhaul of the self-regulatory system:
[T]he NYSE and Amex historically dominated trading in their listed securities, and
market makers dominated trading in NASDAQ stocks. Today, however, in the
NASDAQ market, automated market centers (such as NASDAQ's order collector,
aggregator, and execution system, SuperMontage, the Archipelago exchange
("ArcaEx"), and the INET ECN) have captured more than 50% of share volume.
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,258. In 2005, NYSE executed
80% of the volume in its listed stocks. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech
at the Economic Club of New York: Strengthening Our Equity Market Structure (Sept. 7, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch0907l0mls.htm. By 2010, that figure had
dropped to 26%. Id.As SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro explained: "The remaining volume is split
among more than 10 public exchanges, more than 30 dark pools, and more than 200 intemalizing
broker-dealers." Id.
126. See Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1087-89; Badway & Busch, supra
note 63, at 1358-59, 1364-65 (citing Robert Kuttner, The Big Board: Crying Out for Regulation,
BUS. WK., Oct. 13, 2003, at 26) (arguing that deregulation of the securities industry has led to the
weakening of regulation authority by SROs).
127. See Badway & Busch, supra note 63, at 1358-59; Iris H-Y Chiu, SecuritiesIntermediaries
in the Internet Age and the TraditionalPrincipal-Agent Model of Regulation: Some Observations
from European Union Securities Regulation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 307, 318 (2007).
128. Chiu, supra note 127, at 318; Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation, supra note 14, at
331 ("[T]echnology made pure brokerage profitable. New electronic trading systems capitalized on
technological improvements to offer more efficient, if non-traditional, venues for trade execution
without sponsoring the intermediation of a dealer.").
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ATSs and electronic communications networks ("ECNs") have used
technology to provide a low-cost alternative.129 The regulatory costs that
the exchanges face have not encumbered these alternatives. 30 To
encourage their proliferation, the SEC did not require that they register
as exchanges, but rather as broker-dealers.' 31 The 32mutually-owned
exchanges also faced the self-interest of the specialists.
Competition for listings has come from abroad as well. 33 In a 2006
interim report, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (also
known as the Paulson Committee) found "that the United States is losing
its leading competitive position
as compared to stock markets and
134
abroad."'
centers
financial
The multiplicity of trading venues has crippled exchanges' abilities
to exercise market power to discipline members as well as their ability to

129. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 87, at 570-71. Macey and O'Hara wrote:
Because of the reduction in transaction costs, particularly with regard to the acquisition
and deployment of the technology and communications systems needed for trading and
for monitoring trading, exchange members such as Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch
not only participate directly in the operation of the stock exchange but simultaneously
compete with the stock exchanges, both by internalizing order flow on the buy and sell
side of the same transaction and by offering ECNs and ATSs that directly compete with
the exchanges for order flow from third parties.
Id.
130. Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1260 ("[C]ontinuing to demand existing exchanges
to invest in their regulatory efforts puts them at a grave disadvantage against newcomers.").
131. Dombalagian, Self andSelf-Regulation, supra note 14, at 331-32. Dombalagian explained:
Virtually all of these systems were permitted to operate as registered broker-dealers in
the United States, rather than as exchanges, in order to facilitate their
proliferation.... To the extent that many brokerage firms were investing in competing
execution or market making technologies, exchange members increasingly found
themselves in direct competition with their regulators.
Id.
132. Id.at 332 ("The mutual structure of the primary exchanges, encumbered as it was by
members' (and in particular, specialists') self-interest, prevented the adoption of new execution
technologies in favor of traditional intermediated trading.").
133. Macey & Kanda, supra note 83, at 1025 (quoting Lawrence Harris, The Dangers of
Regulatory Overreaction to the October 1987 Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 936 (1989)).
According to Macey and Kanda:
[E]quity trading that occurs on the floor of the NYSE can easily shift overseas. For
example, on October 19, 1987, the day of the most recent market crash, one billion
dollars of American stocks were traded in London before the New York markets opened.
This "shows that American securities markets are vulnerable to foreign competition on a
meaningful scale."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Lawrence Harris, The Dangers of Regulatory Overreaction to the
October 1987 Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1989)).
134. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
229, 234 (2007) (quoting COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMfIEE
ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION ix (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/
pdfs/1 1.30CommitteeInterim ReportREV2.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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monitor individual member firms.1 35 The threat of
expulsion from one
136
venue can no longer function to deter misconduct.
Some predict exchanges will reduce the rigor with which they
enforce their rules so as to prevent the migration of trading. 137 Jonathan
Macey and Maureen O'Hara describe a free-rider situation that leads to
the underproduction of regulation. 138 Industry observers speculate that
135. See Macey & Kanda, supranote 83, at 1011-12. According to Macey and Kanda:
While these technological developments have not rendered the organized exchanges
obsolete by any means, they have allowed for the emergence of over-the-counter and
other computer-linked securities markets as substitute providers of liquidity. These
markets, particularly the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotations ("NASDAQ"), have deprived the exchanges of any significant market power
over listing firms.
Id. (footnote omitted). They continued:
[W]hile organized exchanges were historically the sole providers of these services, over
time a wide variety of close substitutes has developed. While these close substitutes
generally are not exchanges themselves, they nevertheless directly compete with the
organized exchanges. Due to the emergence of these substitutes, it no longer is
appropriate to view the organized exchanges as monopolies. Instead, they should be
perceived and regulated as members of a highly competitive industry.
Id. at 1010. Gadinis and Jackson explained:
[lincreasing competition may gradually erode the dominant power of exchanges, which
was a critical assumption underlying the old self-regulatory model. The new alternative
venues for listing, while performing functions identical or very similar to those of the
exchanges, often lack the financial resources and the market power to build an adequate
regulatory apparatus.
Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1260; see also Karmel, Securities SROs, supra note 91, at 153.
Many have commented on the competing interests of the SEC to empower SROs to enforce
compliance by their members, while preventing SROs from constraining competition among trading
venues. See Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 82, at 1091; Dombalagian, Self and SelfRegulation,supra note 14, at 328. Dombalagian added:
The Exchange Act does not specifically define the term "exchange" by reference to the
potential for exercising dominant market power. Nevertheless, the Commission has
acknowledged that a market's ability to restrict access or to condition access on
compliance with rules restricting the activities of its members may compel exchange
registration.
Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supranote 82, at 1091.
136. See Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1259-60.
137. Macey & O'Hara, supranote 87, at 580. Macey and O'Hara wrote:
The SEC is pressuring the exchanges to engage in self-regulation. The exchanges are
required to police trading on their floors aggressively-which they do not do, because
they are concerned that if they are aggressive enough to satisfy the SEC, trading will
migrate to other venues.
This phenomenon exhibits some of the characteristics of a "race to the bottom" or a
"competition in laxity" in which competitive conditions provide incentives for
exchanges to refrain from enforcing their own investor-protection rules for fear of losing
market share.
Id.
138. Macey & O'Hara, supranote 87, at 576. According to Macey and O'Hara:
As with other public goods, the regulatory activities conducted by the NYSE and
other exchanges are subject to significant free-rider problems. Rival trading
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trading that once occurred on exchanges would move to markets with
less regulation. 139 Efforts to maintain their members would drive 40the
exchanges to loosen their member and market supervision programs. 1
In the mid-2000s, some industry associations considered the
possibility of throwing out the SRO system, with the SEC filling the
14 1
void, or consolidating all SRO regulatory oversight into one SRO.
Many argued that the SEC needed to step in where it was no longer
feasible to expect exchange SROs to do the job.142 Commentators
pointed to other important jurisdictions for securities markets that have
abandoned the self-regulatory system, concluding 43 finally that the
conflicts of interest make self-regulation unworkable.

venues, particularly companies operating ATSs and ECNs, can free-ride on these
regulatory efforts, since those venues can trade NYSE-and [NASDAQ]-listed
securities without incurring any regulatory costs. Individual investors and traders
who transact on other markets do not pay for regulation, but they directly benefit
from it. Since the NYSE and other exchanges cannot exclude rival companies from
the benefits stemming from the exchanges' regulatory expenditures, they will
likely underproduce regulation.
Id.
139. Macey & Kanda, supra note 83, at 1024-25 ("[Ilf the NYSE alters its pricing policies in
ways that harm listed firms, nonexchange members who trade the stock of such firms can simply
redirect their trading volume to rival exchanges on which the shares are dually listed.").
140. Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1255-56 ("As the numbers of listing venues
multiply, exchanges will be less willing to displease the issuers they fought hard to attract. Thus,
exchanges might be tempted to relax their corporate governance enforcement efforts.").
141. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, White Paper for the Securities Industry Association:
Reinventing Self-Regulation 20-22 (Jan. 5, 2000), available at http://archives2.sifma.org/
marketstructure/html/siawhitepaperfinal.htm#_Toc52859676 (last updated Oct. 14, 2003); Rachel
McTague, In Pushfor Single SRO for Brokers, SIA Enunciates Its Goals, Principles,38 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 162, at 162 (Jan. 30, 2006).
142. See, e.g., Dombalagian, Self andSelf-Regulation, supranote 14, at 326-27; Nan S. Ellis et
al., The NYSE Response to Specialist Misconduct: An Example of the Failureof Self-Regulation, 7
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 102, 148-49 (2010); Macey & O'Hara, supra note 87, at 582-83. According to
Dombalagian:
[W]ith the internationalization of investment firms, there have been parallel efforts to
regulate financial responsibility on a groupwide basis rather than at the level of the
individual SEC-regulated brokerage firm, and to standardize capital requirements for all
firms. While SROs attempt to exercise some oversight over the corporate parents of their
members, the Commission is ultimately better positioned to enter into discussions with
both domestic and foreign financial services regulators to harmonize such rules.
Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation, supra note 14, at 326-27 (citations omitted).
143. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 87, at 593, 595-98, 594-95 tabl.1; see also Black, supra note
84, at 115 (describing opponents' take on self-regulation as "self-serving, self-interested, lacking in
sanctions, beset with free rider problems, and simply a sham"); Ellis et al., supra note 142, at 148.
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IV.

FINRA's Loss OF MARKET POWER AND
WEAKENED ENFORCEMENT ABILITY

A. Changes in the BrokerageIndustry
1. Rise of Online Discount Brokerages and Thinning Profits
The brokerage dealer industry is in the process of contracting. The
numbers of broker-dealer firms and registered representatives are
falling. 144 The number of firms and representatives registered with
FINRA has fallen since 2005.45 In 2010 alone, 14,000 advisors left Wall
Street, constituting a decrease of 4. 1%.146 Contributing factors include
competitive pressure from online discount brokerages, languid trading
volume during and following the financial crisis, and potential
opportunities in the investment adviser space. 141
Most broker-dealers make money on the commissions they charge
per trade. Trading volumes are at their lowest since 2007.148 The small
and boutique trading firms that make up a substantial portion of
FINRA's membership often generate revenues solely from commissions
on individual
trades and the proprietary research reports for their
149
clients.
144.

See, e.g., Bruce Kelly, Why Are Small Broker-Dealers Disappearing?, INVESTMENT

NEWS (May 30, 2010), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100530/REG/305309970.
145. Since 2005, "[t]he number of FINRA-member firms has decreased by 10.4%," and "[t]he
number of registered representatives has decreased by 3.8%." SEC STUDY, supranote 68, at 8 n.12;
see also 2010: Was the Year of the Battered Broker-Dealer, SEC. FRAUD BLOG (Jan. 7, 2011),

http://stockmarketlawsuit.com/securitiesfraudlawyer/?p=558.
146.

U.S. Brokerage Industry Shrinking Fast, Says Analyst, REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2011),

http://www.reuters.com/video/2011/08/25/us-brokerage-industry-shrinking-fast-say?videold =
218694393 (displaying a video interview with Bing Waldert, Analyst, Cerulli Associates, in which
he speculates on the difficult next few years for independent brokers because of expensive new
regulation). A number of independent broker-dealers exited from March 2010 through February
2011. Independent Broker-Dealer Exits: March 2010-Present, INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 28, 2011,

1:05 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110228/chart02/110229947.
147.

(Dec.

See Joseph A. Giannone, Online Brokers Are Gaining On Big Brokers: Report, REUTERS

1, 2010), //www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/01/us-onlinebrokers-idUSTRE6BO6H82010

1201; Joseph A. Giannone, Tough Markets Took Toll on US. Brokers, Advisers in 2011, REUTERS

(Aug.

6,

2012),

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/06/us-usa-brokerages-marketshare-

idUSBRE87511L20120806; Matt Egan, Sick of the Street, Some FinancialAdvisors Fly Solo, Fox

Bus. (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/03/27/fed-up-with-wall-streetsome-financial-advisors-go-independent/.
148.

Hibah Yousuf, Trading Volume at 5-Year Low. Don't Panic., CNN MONEY (Aug. 22,

2012, 7:50 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/22/investing/trading-volume/index.html.
149. Maureen Farrell, Which Brokerage Will Be the Next to Fall?, CNN MONEY (Feb. 8, 2012,
9:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/08/markets/brokerage-trading/index.htm;
Rebecca
Lipman, Brokerage Stocks: Is the Brokerage Industry on Death Watch?, KAPITALL.COM (Feb. 9,

2012),

http://wire.kapitall.com/investment-idea/brokerage-stocks-is-the-brokerage-industry-on-
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Since the mid-1970s, competition on commission rates has thinned
profit margins. Discount brokerages have revolutionized the industry,
charging extremely low, competitive commissions.'" Services once only
offered as a package began to unbundle. 5 ' Retail investors were
suddenly able to open accounts with brokerages that performed only
execution services and charged very low commissions in return. 52
The advent of Internet discount brokerage services in the late 1990s
continued to put pressure on the traditional broker-dealer model. 153 Even
the large full service brokerages joined the Internet wave, perhaps
begrudgingly, in the late nineties. 154 By the end of 1999, Citibank,
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Prudential Securities, and Merrill Lynch
mania of a
were all offering online trading.' 55 During the tech 15stock
6
boomed.
non-professionals
by
trading
day
decade ago,
While the day trading craze of that era has ended, the online do-ityourself platform has grown, particularly following the financial
crisis. 157 Between 2008 and 2010, online brokers gained approximately

three percentage points of market share, while the wirehouses and other
brokerages lost over 5% combined. 158 During that same time, assets in
online brokerages grew by more than a trillion dollars, rising to $3.7
trillion, and are predicted to reach $5 trillion by the end of 2014.'
death-watch/ (explaining that three small but well-known firms have had to close due to this
declining business-WJB Capital Group, Ticonderoga Securities, and Kaufman Brothers).
150. Chiu, supra note 127, at 318-19. Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. was one of the first. In 1975,
the company began with $70 a trade, an extremely low commission rate for the time. David Segal,
Day Traders2.0: Wired,Angry and Loving It, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2010, at BU1.
151. Chiu, supra note 127, at 318.
152. See id.
at 318-19 (describing the "disaggregation" of broker services).
153. See Joseph Kahn, Full-Service Brokerage Firms Seek Foothold on Line, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
21, 1999, at C2.
154. See Securities Trading on the Internet: SEC Regulation of Internet Broker-Dealersand
Alternative Trading Systems, STROOCK CAPITAL MKTS. (Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP), Aug.
1999, at 1.

155. Id. Merrill Lynch, with eight million customers and 18,000 retail brokers, finally gave in
and started an online trading business. Id
156. Seeid.
157. Andrew Osterland, Do-It-Yourself Model Gaining Ground on Advisers, INVESTMENT
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2012, 6:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120226/
REG/302269982.
158. Id The wirehouses are estimated to have lost 1.1 percentage points and other brokerages
four percentage points. Id.
159. Id. Such online brokers include Charles Schwab, Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC, TD
Ameritrade Inc., and The Vanguard Group. Id.Although the online market still has "less than a
third of the nearly $12.5 trillion managed by financial advisors," their share of the assets "grew at a
compounded annual rate of 19%, compared with 14% in adviser channels of distribution in that
two-year period." 1d; see also Lavonne Kuykendall, Cost of Advice a Key Factor for
(March
18,
2012,
6:01
AM),
Budget-Conscious Clients, INVESTMENT
NEWS
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120318/REG/303189981.
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The overwhelming majority (approximately 67%) of all U.S.
households now have a direct investing account. 60 While only a quarter
of those households use their direct accounts as their primary investment
relationship, that figure is expected to grow in the future.161 Internet
brokerages are constantly broadening their product and service offerings
"with varying levels of guidance and advice."'' 62 Their websites offer
ever-improving financial planning tools and research and increasingly
provide many of the offline traditional brokerage services at reduced
rates.' 63 At least one industry analyst expects direct providers will
control about $380 billion or 10% of all retail managed accounts by
2014."' 4
2. Shift to Investment Adviser Profession
The investment adviser ("IA") profession is growing. Between
2004 and 2010, the number of lAs registered with the SEC grew by
38.5% 165 The assets under management of SEC-registered lAs grew by
58.9% over that period. 166 In contrast, since 2005, the amount of FINRA

160. Osterland wrote:
It isn't just the lower end of the investor spectrum that is choosing a self-directed path. In
fact, high-net-worth investors, according to Ms. Wolf, have made an even more
substantial shift to self-directed investing. In 2008, a survey of 550 investors with at least
$5 million in investible assets found that 21% said their investing orientation was selfdirected; 36% said they were adviser-directed. In 2011, the proportions were reversed,
with 36% self-directed versus 22% adviser-directed. The survey was conducted by
Cerulli and Phoenix Marketing International Inc.
Osterland, supra note 157.
161. Id. According to Osterland:
Some migration of assets to self-directed platforms is by design-at least from the
wirehouses' perspective. The major Wall Street firms have been raising minimum
account thresholds for their financial advisers for years in an effort to improve their
productivity. Merrill Lynch Wealth Management, for one, this year lowered payouts to
its advisers on accounts of less than $250,000-in some cases, not paying anything if
they have too many such accounts.
Id.
162. See id.
163. See id. ("Managed-account programs at some of the larger companies may even have
estate attorneys on staff for consultation. In general, the fees in such programs are less than 1% of
assets. 'The offerings are pretty extensive and can replicate what traditional advisers offer."'
(quoting Cerulli Associates Inc. Associate Director Katherine Wolf)).
164. Id.
165. SEC STUDY, supra note 68, at 6 n.3. As of 2010, there were more than 11,000 lAs
registered with the SEC and more than 275,000 state-registered IA representatives. Id. at 6. There
are also 15,000 state-registered lAs. Id.
166. Id.at 6 n.3. In 2004, assets under management of registered lAs totaled $24.1 trillion. Id.
The IAs registered with the SEC "manage more than $38 trillion for more than 14 million individual
and institutional clients." Id. at 6. This amount excludes the assets under the management of stateregistered IAs. See id.
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member firms has decreased by 10.4% and the number of registered
representatives of broker-dealers has decreased by 3.8%.167
There is significant overlap between the two groups, although lAs
are not subject to FINRA's jurisdiction. 68 As of 2010, "approximately
88% of IA representatives were also registered representatives of a
FINRA registered [firm]. ' , 169 However, the number of fee-only advisers
grew from 29% to 66% of the market in 2010, while commission-only
advisers fell from 35% to 12%."'
Many industry insiders, as well as recent business reorganizations,
suggest a general shift away from the broker-dealer, commission-based
model to the investment advisory, fee-based model.' 7 ' At Charles
167. Id. at 8 n.12. There is also a demographics problem posing "'an imminent threat to the
broker-dealers' future,' [according to] James Roth, a managing director at Pershing, the Bank of
New York Mellon correspondent clearing unit that provides record-keeping, trading products and
services and financing to small brokerage and investment advisory firms." Joseph A. Giannone,
Graying Brokers: Retirement Wave Creates Talent Gap, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2011, 10:02 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/18/brokerages-recruiting-idUSN1419145120110418.
According to large wirehouses, brokerages are finding it difficult to keep their personnel at current
levels, See id.According to a recent consulting firm industry study, "[m]ore than a third of U.S.
financial advisers will turn sixty-five over the next ten years." Id.The percentage of brokers fiftyfive and older has been increasing for the last few decades, while the number of brokers forty-five
and younger has been dropping. Id. Young college graduates are less and less interested. Id. The
large wirehouses have started to change their recruiting source by now going after independent
brokers, once looked down upon by the big firms. Helen Keamey, Big Firms Look to Hire
Independent Brokers, REUTERS (May 19, 2011, 11:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/05/19/us-advisers-recruiting-idUSTRE74156220110519.
168. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalizationof the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (2009) (noting that since 1996, the SEC and state
regulators have shared supervisory authority over lAs). Sandra Gotlaufa explained:
The Investment Advisers Act defines an investment adviser as "any person who, for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications and writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities." Thus, if a client wants to purchase or sell
securities, the investment adviser will provide analysis and advice; however, the adviser
will not execute the transaction for the client but will instead refer the client to a brokerdealer.
Day-Traders: A
Sandra Gotlaufa, Comment, The Business of Turning Rookies into "Professional'"
Callfor Improved Regulation of Day-Trading Training Firms, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 175, 205 (2011)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2006 & Supp. IV
2011)).
169. SEC STUDY, supra note 68, at 12.
170. Mark Schoeff, Jr., Market Volatility Represents Opportunity to Expand Advice Business:
TD's Bradley, INVESTMENT NEWS (Oct. 13, 2011, 2:10 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20111013/FREE/I 11019954.
171. See id (quoting Tom Bradley, President of TD Ameritrade Institutional, discussing largescale flow of money, resources, and opportunities from broker-dealers to registered investment
advisories). One commentator has called this abandonment of the brokerage model "the largest shift
in the financial services world in a hundred years." Josh Brown, Perhaps I've Been a Bit Too
Harsh.... WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2012, 2:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/financial-adviser/
2012/01/25/perhaps-ive-been-a-bit-too-harsh/; see also B-Ds Voice Margin Concerns Arisingfrom
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Schwab, "customers moved $21 billion into assorted fee-based advice
offerings. 172 In addition to the trouble broker-dealers are facing (as
discussed above) there are some industry insiders that see actual
business opportunities for advisors in today's financial services
environment. 173 Large firms are exiting the independent broker-dealer
space to focus on their wealth management offering, citing the large
regulatory, technology, and human capital costs associated 1with
the
75
broker-dealer model. 174 Brokers are also taking a "hybrid" route.
Congress, RIA Conversions, FIN. ADVISOR (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.fa-mag.com/fa-news/9752b-ds-voice-margin-concems-arising-from-congress-ria-conversions.html
("Broker-dealers at the
Financial Services Institute's OneVoice conference in Orlando shared their concerns that new
regulations from Washington, coupled with the migration of advisors to the RIA business model,
were acting to squeeze their firms' profit margins."). Broker-dealer Raymond James Financial
Services CEO Dick Averitt recently "speculated that the migration of reps to the RIA space could
turn out to be a long-lasting megatrend." Id Raymond James is also a corporate registered advisory
firm ("RIA"), under which brokers can "dual-register as advisers or independent contractor fee-only
advisors." Brown, supra. Twenty-five years ago, "Raymond James' independent contractor business
was a small part of the firm's total revenues," but it is now the firm's biggest business. Id. If the
shift away from the broker-dealer model proves permanent, "Averitt noted Raymond James will
have to make adjustments to maintain their profitability." Id
172. Segal, supra note 150.
173. See Schoeff, Jr., supranote 170.
174. See, e.g., Brace Kelly, Edelman Financialto Exit Indie-Rep Business, INVESTMENT NEWS
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20111011/FREE/111019975. Edelman
Financial Group ("Edelman") managed about $17 billion in client assets from 43 U.S. offices. Dan
Jamieson, Edelman Financial to Be Bought for $257 Million, INVESTMENT NEWS (Apr. 16,
2012, 1:12 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120416/FREE/120419954. Edelman
announced last year that it was exiting the independent-contractor brokerage business, citing severe
flaws in the model and economics, as well as the independent broker-dealer space, which would
affect approximately 15 practices and 75 representatives-to focus on the wealth management
space. Kelly, supra. The hurdles in the independent broker-dealer space that he cited included
"competition for advisers, regulatory demands on managing and supervising those practices, and
technology demands and requirements. 'Those all make it very difficult to manage the business
successfully without scale."' Id. (quoting co-CEO Ric Edelman). In April, it was announced that a
private equity firm will be buying Edelman for $257 million, well above its current stock price.
Jamieson, supra.
175. Helen Kearney, Advisers Take "Hybrid" Route to Independence, REUTERS (March 16,
2011, 11:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/hybrid-advisers-idUSNO926160
520110316 ("Independent broker-dealers are increasingly establishing registered investment
advisers for brokers experimenting with fee-based models, while custodians are offering accountintegration software and introducing RIAs to independent brokers willing to house their commission
business."). RIAs hold on to their brokerage licenses for those "clients who prefer paying
commissions on a transaction basis, or who cannot afford the conventional annual fee of 1 to 2
percent of assets a year charged by most individual investment advisers." Id. Kearney reported that:
From 2004 to 2009, the number of registered investment advisers who held onto their
Series 7 brokerage licenses almost doubled to 14,160, making hybrid the fastest growing
of the seven wealth management channels tracked by consulting firm Cerulli Associates.
(The other categories are big 'wirehouse' brokerages, regional brokerages, insuranceowned brokerages, independent brokers and fee-only advisers.)
Id; see also Kristen French, Former Merrill Guns Launch Hybrid with InternationalAmbitions,
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Apr. 13, 2012), http://wealthmanagement.com/blog/former-merrill-
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B. Impact on FINRA 's Deterrence andEnforcement Efforts
1. Expulsion Is FINRA's Most Severe Sanction
In this Section, we discuss the challenges that the loss of market
power poses to FINRA's regulatory mission. The sanction of
disciplinary fines is intended to deter misconduct. 176 The size of the fine
is intended to be commensurate with the severity of particular
wants the fines to outweigh the benefit
violations. 177 In this way, FINRA
178
to be had from misconduct.
FINRA's rules that enable it to expel members when they fail to
pay their disciplinary fines reflect the SRO's reliance on expulsion as the
ultimate sanction. 179 As the Second Circuit noted, FINRA has always
relied on its threat of expulsion from the brokerage industry to compel
members to pay their disciplinary fines.180 The exchanges and NASD
had monopolies in major corporate stock and liquidity in the case of the
exchanges and the OTC market, and then the brokerage profession, in
the cases of NASD and FINRA. l8 1 As suggested earlier, Congress
crafted the Exchange Act with the belief that expulsion would be an
extreme economic sanction because of the SROs' market power in
extremely valuable resources.18 2 The SRO system assumes that access to
those resources is more
valuable than any fine the SRO system would
83
impose.1
reasonably
This system assumes that members would pay their fines because
the fines would cost less than expulsion from the industry.1 4 Today, we
are likely seeing members make this calculation when they ignore
FINRA's targeted requests for information.18 1 If these individuals
guns-launch-hybrid-intemational-ambitions.
176. See An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (J.H. Bums & H.L.A.
Hart eds.), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 165 (J.H. Bums ed. 1970).

177. Seeid at 167.
178. See id. at 166 (explaining that "[t]he value of the punishment must not be less in any case
than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence"). For a robust overview of the
history and strands of deterrence theory, see generally Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the
Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998).
179. See Fiero v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2006)).
180. Id. at 576 ("[NASD] has always relied exclusively upon its powers to revoke the
registration of or deny reentry into the industry to punish members who do not comply with
sanctions.").
181. See supraPart III.A.
182. See supranotes 88-90 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
184. See supranotes 82, 88-90 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Gregory S. Profeta, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62,055, 98 SEC Docket
(CCII) 1513, 1514-15 (May 6, 2010) (dismissing application for review of FINRA's expulsion for
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submitted the requested information, FINRA would have presumably
detected misconduct. These individuals expect that the amount that
FINRA would have fined for the misconduct would have exceeded the
cost of expulsion. As such, the value of expulsion is the maximum
amount FINRA can fine its members. It is the ceiling.
Because expulsion is the last sanction, once members are expelled,
they have no incentive to pay their fines. 186 FINRA had brought the
action against Fiero because Fiero,
who was both fined and barred, was
87
unwilling to pay the penalty. 1
Prior to 1999, NASD, the predecessor to FINRA, routinely added
fines to sanctions barring individuals and firms from the industry. 188 The
fines were suspended until, and only became due if, an individual sought
to reenter NASD and the broker-dealer industry.1 89 In 1990, NASD
announced a new policy of seeking to collect unpaid disciplinary costs
and fines.1 90 Despite its announced intent, NASD had the lowest
collection rates out of several SROs from 1992 through 1996.191 In 1998,
the SEC began an unsuccessful program to help NASD by obtaining
court orders directing barred individuals to pay their fines.192 Upon the
failing to comply with FINRA's request for information under Rules 8210 and 9552); Bill Singer,
Giving FINRA the Silent Treatment-and Getting Barred for It, BROKE & BROKER (May 7, 2010),
http://www.brokeandbroker.com/index.php?a=blog&id401 (cautioning against the behavior of the
applicant in the Profeta SEC hearing).
186. See Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 82, at 1253 (noting a lack of sanctions available after
the use of expulsion). Federal agencies have notorious undercollection rates for the fines they levy.
See Ezra Ross & Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and WhiteCollar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 453, 456-57 (2011) (reporting that although
the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission "tend to do better than other federal
agencies ... they still collect less than half of the penalties offenders are ordered to pay"); see also
Jean Eaglesham, Chasing Fraud, Then Chasing Cash, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2011, at Cl (reporting
that the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission had failed to collect large amounts
from fines).
187. In Fiero, a NASD "hearing panel expelled Fiero Brothers, barred Fiero from associating
with any FINRA-member firm in any capacity, and fined the Fieros $1,000,000 plus costs, jointly
and severally." Fiero v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 2011).
188.

GAO REPORT, supra note 73, at 2.

189. See id NASD imposed these fines in order to discourage firms and individuals from
seeking reentry into the industry. See id. The fines were rarely collected because violators rarely
sought reentry. Id.
190. Notice to Members 90-21: Collection of Fines and Costs in Disciplinary Proceedings,
FiN. INDusTRIAL REG. AUTHORITY (1990), http://fmra.complinet.com/en/display/displaymain.html
?rbid=2403&element id=1304.
191. See GAO REPORT, supra note 73, at 2, 5. "The securities SROs included the American
Stock Exchange, the Chicago Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the New
York Stock Exchange, and NASD." Id. at 5. The other SROs were the National Futures Association
and other futures SROs. Id.
192. Id. at 11. In seeking to obtain court orders on behalf of NASD, SEC said it was exercising
its authority under Exchange Act § 21(e)(1). Id. Cases were limited to those affirmed on appeal and
that met other specific requirements. Id. Of the cases referred to the SEC in the first two to three
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recommendations of a special NASD task force created in 1998 to
review its sanction and collection policies, NASD changed its
sanctioning policy so that fines would only193be added to sanctions barring
individuals in the "most egregious cases."'
Expelled members were no longer in demand of NASD's service
(permission to work as broker-dealers) and therefore no longer had an
incentive to comply with NASD's fine collection policy. 94 This lack of
incentive remained once NASD became FINRA in 2007. FINRA is
unable to compel compliance because it lacks mechanisms other than
market power to do so.
2. The Cost of Expulsion from FINRA Varies
The problem with the sanctioning framework of FINRA, and the
exchange SROs, is that the cost of expulsion varies, and, as a result,
FINRA's ability to exercise market power varies. The cost varies with
the profitability of the brokerage profession relative to other professions,
and the availability of those alternative professions. The more wealth an
individual can expect to earn as a broker-dealer, the more valuable the
brokerage profession is to that individual. The cost of expulsion is also
reduced by the opportunity cost of not being in another profession, as
well as the price FINRA charges for access to the profession, as
reflected in its membership fees, ongoing regulatory fees, and the
overhead for mandated internal compliance regime. Overhead is
expected to increase in the next few years as new regulatory
requirements impose considerable cost burdens on broker-dealers.'95
Moreover, it is likely that the cost of expulsion is less costly to
those who earn their income through fraudulent business activities. 196
years, the SEC had obtained court orders for eleven. Id.By the spring of 2001, NASD had collected
fines from three of those eleven cases. Id.Interestingly, though, was that NASD collected some or
all of the fines on four cases before the SEC obtained final court orders. Id.
193. Id.at 10. Where there was no widespread customer harm and the "serious wrongdoers had
been removed from the industry," fines need not be imposed. Id.NASD's fine collection rate
improved dramatically when NASD stopped its general practice of levying fines when barring
individuals. Id.at 2. In 1997, NASD collected 25.5% of the $38.8 million it had levied. Id. at 10
tbl.2. In 1998, NASD's levied fines in closed cases amounted to $27.9 million, of which only 39.8%
was collected. Id. In 1999, it collected 67.4% of the $40.3 million levied. Id. By 2000, the amount
NASD fined had decreased to $14.3 million, of which it collected 81.1%. Id.The percentages are
the amount of dollars collected, not the number of firms that were fined and that paid. Id.
at 2.
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., Richard Roth, How the SEC and FINRA Are in Dangerof Destroying Their Own
Industry, INSIDE REG. BEAST BLOG (June 25, 2012), http://wealthmanagement.com/blog/how-sec-

and-finra-are-danger-destroying-their-own-industry (describing how one of FINRA's newest
regulatory requirements, Rule 2111, will impose time and cost burdens on broker-dealers).
196.

Cf Nicholas Guiliano, FINRA Permanently Bars Cambridge Legacy Securities, SEC.

ARB. BLOG (July 19, 2012, 4:01 PM), http://www.securitiesarbitrations.com/Securities-Arbitration-
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We therefore should further discount the cost of expulsion for FINRA
violators. This is because their "skills" are easily re-deployable outside
the brokerage profession.'

97

A former FINRA member can continue trading by opening
accounts with online brokerages, such as Scottrade or TD Ameritrade.' 98
A recent example is Garrett Bauer, who pled guilty in late 2011 to a
seventeen year insider trading scheme that allegedly "netted more than
$32 million since 2006 alone."1 99 Both as a broker-dealer representative
associated with a FINRA member, and then as a stay-at-home online
trader, Bauer purchased and sold shares for himself and his tippees
through his accounts at TD Ameritrade
and Goldman Sachs Execution
20 0
and Clearing, L.P. ("GSEC").
Working on his own may have even been better for him. He was no
longer reliant on his bosses for a bonus, and being on his own lessoned
the risk of getting caught. If Bauer had been barred from FINRA for
perhaps failing to keep his licensing up to date or some other rule
violation unrelated to insider trading, no flags would have been raised
and he could have continued his activities through his online brokerage
account.2°'

(reporting the
Blog/Article/7/2012/220/FFNRA-Permanently-Bars-Cambridge-Legacy-Securities
FINRA expulsion of broker-dealer for selling $23 million worth of private placement offerings
without having reasonable basis for believing they were suitable to be offered to its customers);
Ashley Lau, Texas Broker-DealerExpelled by FINRA Hearing Officer, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2012),
(discussing
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/pinnacle-finra-idUSL2E8FPD5E20120425
the FINRA expulsion of broker-dealer and its president who were found to have raised $10 million
through fraudulent sales).
197. For example, a professional stock trader can conduct trading activity privately from an
apartment. Criminal Complaint at 8 United States v. Bauer, (Mag. No. 11-3536 (MF)), 2011 WL
1279766 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 5, 2011).
198. See, e.g., id. at 8, 13 (showing that a professional stock trader who traded actively in a
private apartment used T.D. Ameritrade to purchase securities).
199. David S. Hilzenrath, Go-Between in Alleged Insider Trading Pleads Guilty, WASH. POST,
Apr. 12, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/middlemanpleads-guilty-in-insider-trading-scheme/2011/04/11/AFV5y9LD story.html.
200. Since 2001, Bauer worked as a professional stock trader with three separate proprietary
trading firms. Criminal Complaint, supra note 197, at 8. He left his last firm in 2010 and began
handling all his trades from his Upper East Side apartment through his online accounts. Id RBC
Professional Trader Group, the proprietary trading firm Bauer was associated with from 2001 to
2008, provided its traders with trading accounts at GSEC. Id. at 9.
201. Federal officials had been investigating the scheme and as early as 1999, TFM Investment
Group ("TFM"), a brokerage firm, sued Bauer alleging that he had non-public information when he
bought options from TFM days before a 1998 deal involving Clorox. TFM Inv. Grp. v. Bauer, No.
Civ. A. 99-840, 1999 WL 820197, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999). The suit was dismissed because
TFM was unable to "indicate how, when, where and from whom defendant allegedly acquired the
non-public, material inside information." Id.at *2; see also Hilzenrath, supra note 199. The insiders
suspended the scheme for five years, concerned that the government was on to them. Criminal
Complaint, supra note 197, at 10-11.
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Expulsion is more costly to those in the highest-paying, most elite
positions, like those held at Goldman Sachs.2 °2 Individuals expelled for
Ponzi schemes and boiler room sales tactics often resurface after getting
barred from FINRA. Some continue to hold themselves out as brokerdealers, orchestrating one Ponzi scheme after another.2 °3 Former brokerdealers may also have outside business interests they can pursue after
getting expelled from FINRA. Several brokers expelled from the
industry in the 1990s for infamous boiler room sales tactics have
interestingly turned up in the jet brokerage industry.20 4
The decreasing profitability of the brokerage profession reduces the
amounts FINRA can fine before violators opt for expulsion and
compresses the range of fines FINRA can impose according to the
severity of violations. 0 5 While the brokerage profession may not be as
profitable, a Ponzi scheme as a broker-dealer may be very profitable.20 6
As the brokerage profession declines in value, the relative value of
misconduct in FINRA increases.
As the ceiling lowers, more misconduct will be more valuable than
expulsion. A wrongdoer's calculus would also change if it were to
decide ex ante that, because the fine likely to be imposed on it would
cost as much as or more than expulsion, it would not pay the fine if
caught. The expectation of being expelled for nonpayment would lead a
rational wrongdoer to behave really badly-violating rules that would
warrant expulsion.20 7

202. See Gotlaufa, supra note 168, at 200-02.
203. James P. Donovan, senior exec. vice president for tech. & strategy, Speech at
XBRL U.S. National Conference (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.finra.org/
Newsroom/Speeches/Donovan/P 120400.
204. See, e.g., Why Are Private Jet Charter Brokers So Sleazy?, PRIVATE FLYER (July 18,
2011, 4:27 AM), http://privateflyer.wordpress.com/2011/07/18/why-are-private-jet-charter-brokersso-sleazy (describing the famous case of Al Palagonia, who was kicked out of the industry in 1998
after his firm, D.H. Blair, a boiler-room operation, was shut down). Palagonia became a jet broker
and head of Halcyon (which went under after accusation of sabotage by its COO). Id. Palagonia is
now at Apollo Jets. Id. Other examples include Todd Rome and Richard Sitomer who were at
Millennium Securities and are now at Bluestar, as well as Manny Scarso and Adgar Alacon who are
at Jet.om. Id.
205. See supra Part IV.A.
206. See Diana B. Henriques & Alex Berenson, The 17th Floor, Where Wealth Went to Vanish,
N.Y. TtMES, Dec. 15, 2008, at Al.
207. See An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,supra note 176, at 165;
Hylton, supra note 178, at 468, 470-71.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Optimal deterrence theory suggests that so long as FINRA's
probability of detecting misconduct is less than one, a would-be offender
will not be deterred unless the penalty is at least as great as the benefit to
be gained by violating FTNRA's rules multiplied by the probability of
detection. 20 8 Private self-regulatory organizations do not have the same
power that the state has to enforce its decisions. Insider traders pursued
by the Department of Justice can be jailed.2 °9 Insider traders pursued by
FINRA can only be fined or expelled from the industry.2 1 ° In other
words, optimal deterrence theory tells us that would-be offenders forgo
misconduct when the value of the penalty is at least as great as the profit
from the offense. 21 1 The optimal value of the penalty is also affected
(inversely) by the probability that the misconduct is detected.21 2 When
the likelihood of detection21is
low, the penalty must be relatively high in
3
order to deter misconduct.
If FINRA's compliance program is weak-detecting only a small
fraction of misconduct-optimal deterrence theory would suggest that
FINRA must either invest in improving its monitoring capabilities or
increase the penalties it imposes for misconduct, or both. However,
absent help from the state to enforce its rulings, if FINRA increases
penalties by making more offenses punishable by expulsion and
increasing the size of the fines it imposes, FINRA risks weakening its
ability to enforce monetary sanctions. Expelled members would
certainly have no incentive to pay the fines that are also imposed on
them.
At the same time, F1NRA could only increase the size of the fines it
imposes to the point that a member prefers paying a fine to being
expelled. Membership in FINRA would lose value and the threat of
expulsion would weaken as a tool to incentivize fine payment. A
wrongdoer's calculus would also change if it were to decide ex ante that,
because the fine likely to be imposed on it would cost as much as
expulsion, it would not pay the fine if caught. As stated earlier, the
208. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards,70 VA. L. REV. 965, 994-95 (1984); Hylton, supra note 178, at 468, 470-7 1.
209. E.g., Peter J. Henning, How Serious a Crime Is Insider Trading?,N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Aug. 10, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/1 0/how-serious-a-crime-is-insidertrading/; Peter Lattman, Galleon Chief Sentenced to 11-Year Term in Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Oct. 13, 2011, 9:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/rajaratnam-issentenced-to- I l-years/.
210. About F1NRA, supra note 1.
211. See Hylton, supranote 178, at 468,470-71.
212. See id.
213. See id.
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expectation of being expelled for nonpayment would lead a rational
wrongdoer to behave really badly and violate rules, thus resulting in
expulsion. 1 4 Therefore, FINRA's enforcement scheme requires that
FINRA detect a sufficient portion of member misconduct.
One way to make expulsion more costly would be to make
expulsion include disqualification from other professions. Expulsion
from FINRA would disqualify individuals from a range of professions
and income-producing sources. Those barred by FINRA are already
subject to a statutory disqualification excluding individuals from other
parts of the securities industry. 2 5 The Maloney Act authorizes FLNRA to
deny membership to those who have been expelled from another SRO,
whether an association or exchange. 21 6 Under FINRA's By-Laws, a
person subject to such a statutory disqualification "cannot become
associated with or continue to be associated with any FINRA member
firm unless the member firm applies to FINRA and is granted
permission for [the disqualified person] to be associated with the
firm.,2 1 7 SROs must give notice that they are willing to offer
membership to someone with a statutory disqualification or to allow a

214. This is similar to marginal deterrence concerns, which suggest "that a very harsh
punishment would not discourage the offender from committing a more harmful act which carried
the same, or only slightly harsher, punishment." Id.at 426.
215. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(39)(A) (2006). According to the
statute:
A person is subject to a 'statutory disqualification' with respect to membership or
participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organization, if such
person-has been and is expelled or suspended from membership or participation in, or
barred or suspended from being associated with a member of, any self-regulatory
organization ....

Id.See Feins v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 81 F.3d 1215, 1218 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Statutory
disqualifications include primarily prior felony convictions, willful violations of the federal
securities laws, and other conduct that has, or could have, resulted in expulsion or suspension from a
self-regulatory organization.").
216. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g)(2). According to the statute:
A registered securities association may, and in cases in which the Commission, by order,
directs as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors
shall, deny membership to any registered broker or dealer, and bar from becoming
associated with a member any person, who is subject to a statutory disqualification.
Id.
217. Mathis v. SEC, 671 F.3d 210, 216 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012). Earlier this year, the SEC approved
new FINRA restrictions on new applicants' and certain members' association with statutorily
disqualified parties. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 1113
(Restriction Pertaining to New Member Applications) and to Amend the FINRA Rule 9520 Series
(Eligibility Proceedings), Exchange Act Release No. 34-63,933 (Feb. 18, 2011), 76 Fed. Reg.
10,629, 10,629-30 (Feb. 25, 2011); Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA
Rule 1113 (Restriction Pertaining to New Member Applications) and to Amend the FINRA Rule
9520 Series (Eligibility Proceedings), Exchange Act Release No. 34-63,316 (Nov. 15, 2010),
75 Fed. Reg. 71,166, 71,166-67 (Nov. 22, 2010).
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person with a statutory disqualification to associate with a member. 218 If
a bar from FINRA also disqualified individuals from certain sales
activities (depending on the misconduct that led to expulsion) or opening
online trading accounts, FINRA's market power would be increased.
To compensate for the reduced value of the penalty of expulsion,
FINRA might also want to invest in improving its detection. 21 9 In 2009,
the FINRA Special Review Committee, formed by FINRA's Board of
Governors, produced a report examining FINRA's examination
programs, and specifically, its examinations of Bernard Madoff's and R.
Allen Stanford's firms. 220 The Committee concluded that FINRA's
jurisdiction should be expanded to include 1A oversight. 22 1 Although it
had inspected Madoff over the years, it was prevented from investigating
the IA side of Madoff's business, which is where the fraud reportedly
occurred. 22 Without the help of the courts or the SEC to enforce fines,
FINRA's enforcement scheme requires that FINRA find ways to
increase its market power or its detection capabilities.

218.

7 FEDERAL PROCEDURE: COMMODITY AND STOCK EXCHANGES § 13:378 (2008).

219.

See Hylton, supra note 178, at 468, 470-71.

220.

SPECIAL REVIEW COMM. REPORT, supranote 75, at 1.

221. Id. at 6, 71-72; see also Ben Protess, A Regulator Moves Postcrisisto Expand Power over
Wall St., N.Y. TIMES DEAL3OOK (Apr. 25, 2011, 6:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/04/25/postcrisis-a-regulator-moves-to-expand-power-over-wall-st/ (quoting Richard Ketchum
as saying, "We can't continue to have an environment where less than 10 percent of investment
advisers are examined each year. For some relatively smaller ones, it's more than 10 years. That's
not an acceptable investor protection environment"); Mark Schoeff, Jr., IAA, FINRA Rivalry
Hotting up As SRO Bill Nears, INVESTMENT NEWS (Mar. 9, 2012, 1:52 PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120309/FREE/120309874.
222. SPECIAL REVIEW COMM. REPORT, supra note 75, at 4-5, 50-51.
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